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A Sobering Thought 
'We all make decisions whose consequences are affected by future events. If 
we could forecast the future with accuracy, then we would look pretty good 
to our family, friends, and colleagues. So we become easy pigeons for a 
plethora of persuasive prognosticators who are eager to sell us their wares. 
Like the infamous snake oil salesman of the past, they ply their trade with 
deftness, and we are eager to gulp their concoctions," 
l 
Lawrence S. Davidson, 1989, p.2 
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Abstract 
Much has been written about the use of multiple discriminant analysis 
in corporate distress classification and forecasting. Classification and 
prediction models are notoriously difficult to establish in such a way-
that they will stand the ultimate test of time. Many articles severely 
criticise the use of the technique yet there are aspects which may 
improve our ability to develop satisfactory models. We are probably yet 
a long way off from being able to do so with any great degree of 
satisfaction, yet it behoves us to try to develop modeis that do justice 
to the assumptions and the theory. This thesis explores several 
important aspects of the model-building process and concludes that 
some of the more conventional criticisms of the models developed so 
far are less important than claimed. It suggests that more critical than 
the failure to meet the conditions of multivariate normality, the equality 
of the variance-covariance matrices, and the use of a priori probabilities 
are the need for: a satisfactory model specification that can be 
theoretically justified, the strict use of random sampling, the efficient 
use of sample data, the search for stable mean vectors which are 
significantly different from each other, and ex ante validation. If these 
requirements are met then the MDA technique is robust enough to 
cope with breaches of the assumptions. 
~--------------------c_h_a_p_te_r_o_n_e ____________________ ~l 
PROBLEMS IN CLASSIFYING AND FORECASTING COMPANY 
FAILURE WITH MULTIPLE LINEAR DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS. 
INTRODUCTION: 
Since Beaver first published his study of corporate distress prediction or 
classification in the late 1960s and since Altman first published his work 
using multivariate linear discriminant functions two years later, many 
other multivariate models have been developed for a range of 
industries in different economies. Multiple linear discriminant analysis 
[MDA] has been extensively used in the process by many researchers 
who seem to have ignored important aspects and limitations of the 
technique. Several authors [e.g. joy & Tollefson,1975; Eisenbeis,1977; 
Jones,1987] have published comprehensive articles, which, amongst 
other issues, outline some of the failures which are likely to occur if 
MDA is inappropriately used. 
For over 20 years now multivariate discriminant analysis has been used 
to build models from which we have attempted to classify and/or 
forecast company failure. While published models usually discriminate 
well between those companies which fail and those which remain in 
business, they are usually less successful when tested against a 11hold-
out11 sample. When tested against other samples from the same 
population, or when evaluated in another time period they frequently 
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fail dismally. Norusis [1986] discusses this issue, but offers no solutions 
to the problem. There are several reasons why seemingly satisfactory 
discriminant models of corporate failure themselves fail. In a review of 
the literature this chapter defines each of these issues in turn, and 
identifies several issues about which further research is needed. In 
subsequent chapters each issue is explored in detail. 
The academic community is aware of the strengths and weaknesses of 
forecasting models of corporate distress as many of the issues have 
been discussed quite widely in the literature. As Jones, [1987], points 
out "the preferred statistical technique has evolved from univariate to discriminant to 
logit analysis ...... Researchers have noted that discriminant analysis, a popular 
multivariate technique, requires the assumptions of multivariate normality and equal 
covariances and that these assumptions are typically violated.," [p.156] A central 
focus of this thesis is that although there are frequent violations of the 
assumptions this may done under certain conditions and yet the 
technique may still work satisfactorily. We need to be able to 
understand and recognise the kinds of circumstances under which we 
may violate these assumptions and still produce valid discriminant 
models. We need to be sure that we do not over react in our critical 
evaluation of the use of discriminant models. If we examine the source 
of some of the failures, and if we clearly identify the issues involved 
then we can still use multiple linear discriminant analysis as a 
modelling technique to produce valid models of corporate distress. The 
cause of failure of MDA models is not so much in the discriminant 
methodology, although the valid application may be very exacting, but 
in its wrongful or naive usage or is sourced in the nature of the data 
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itself, or more particularly in the manner in which models have been 
specified. If the source of the failure lies in the ratio data itself, in that 
the mean differences are insignificant, then the pursuit of discriminant 
models is a waste of time, for unless they are correctly specified there 
will be a complete distortion of the true or underlying relationships in 
the model. 
MULTIVARIATE LINEAR DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS THE 
TECHNIQUE 
Multivariate linear discriminant analysis provides an optimal linear 
transformation of a set of variables which are usually, but not 
necessarily, called ratios in the case of distress prediction/classification. 
Where the means of the ratios of the groups of failing and non-failing 
companies are multivariately normally distributed the z-scores will be 
univariately normally distributed. Whether or not the data actually does 
conform to the multivariate normal distribution is another question. If 
the respective group means of these z-scores are well separated on the 
number line, the researcher has a good chance of discriminating 
between those companies that are failing and those that are not. The 
extent to which this separation is adequate or otherwise, is a function 
of the significance of the difference between the respective mean 
vectors of the original ratio data, and the intercorrelations between 
those individual ratios or other variables. 
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Where the variance - covariance matrices are unequal however, the 
recommended approach is to use quadratic discriminant analysis. 
Comparisons between the results of linear and quadratic discriminant 
analysis have been carried out, [Lachenbruch, 1975]. In some cases the 
results of the linear model have been just as good a predictor or 
classifier as those of the quadratic model. This tends to reinforce the 
notion that the matter of the equality of the respective variance -
covariance matrices is of little importance. Part of this research 
attempts to explain why linear discriminant models sometimes fail and 
why they are sometimes successful despite the breach of the equality 
assumption. 
Linear discriminant computing programmes usually assume that the 
underlying population variance - covariance matrices are equal. When 
the sample data does not reflect this phenomenon an estimate of the 
so-called population matrix is made. The normal computing procedure 
is to take a pooled estimate of the variance - covariance matrices based 
upon a weighted average of the respective sample sizes for failed and 
non-failed groups. While this approach may seem economical in some 
ways, it creates problems because there is an interaction effect when 
combined with a priori probabilities. 
It is important to remind ourselves here also, that the objective of 
sample based research is to produce statistical models which estimate 
population parameters in an unbiased manner. Criticisms of the 
sampling strategies employed by researchers working in the field of 
Page 1: 5 
corporate distress classification/prediction are well documented, [e.g. 
Jones, 1987]. What is particularly important to recognise as far as this 
paper is concerned, is that in computing the sample discriminant 
function and the associated z-scores, we should be attempting to 
obtain the best estimates of the population discriminant function and 
associated z-scores for the particular population of companies which 
we are investigating. Furthermore, when we use such samples we 
should be attempting to estimate the population distributions of these 
z-scores for both failed and non-failed companies. This point is almost 
invariably over-looked in the literature on distress modelling. That this 
may lead to a biased estimate of the cut-off point has been dealt with, 
[Overall & Klett, 1972], what is not so widelyappreciated, is that the 
objective should be to estimate the distribution of z-scores for the 
respective populations of failed and non-failed companies, because in 
subsequent applications of any model that might be developed, we will 
select a company and evaluate the extent to which it comes from the 
population of failed or non-failed firms. 
TYPE I and TYPE II ERRORS. 
Any statistical modelling process involves the risk of misclassifying the 
observed data and thereby developing inappropriate conclusions. 
When we attempt to develop a classification or prediction model that 
helps us determine whether a firm is likely to fall into the bankrupt of 
non-bankrupt category, we are in danger of inaccurately classifying at 
least a proportion of the time. There are two types of errors, Types I 
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and II, that we can make in this respect. Altman [1968] defines a Type I 
error as the misclassification of a bankrupt firm as being non-bankrupt, 
and conversely, a Type II error, as that of misclassifying a non-bankrupt 
firm as being bankrupt. The size of our Type I and II errors provides us 
with an indication of the usefulness of our models. A priori probabilities 
affect the size of our Types I and II errors however. 
A LITERATURE REVIEW: 
Although much has been written on the subject of multiple linear 
discriminant analysis since it was first developed by Fisher in the 1930s, 
it was of course, not until Altman first published his research on 
predicting corporate failure in 1968 that the question of the application 
of the technique in this field became a matter of academic debate. Joy 
& Tollefson [1975] provided the first methodological critique of the 
specific use of the technique in corporate classification and prediction. 
Eisenbeis [1977] contributed to the issue very significantly with his 
paper in the journal of Finance, and followed this with a joint 
publication on the matter a few years later, [1981]. Several other 
significantly important papers on the subject were published in the 
1980s; Zmijewski [1984], Jones [1987] and finally a working paper by 
Pacey & Pham [1988]. Each is reviewed in order to outline their 
particular contribution to understanding why discriminant models of 
corporate failure ultimately fail themselves. 
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Joy & Tollefson outline the role of multivariate discriminant analysis in 
their paper. "If the m attribute measurements arise from multivariate normal 
populations such that the categories have identical variance - covariance matrices, but 
different mean values for the attributes, then linear multiple discriminant analysis 
provides an optimal solution to the classification problem. When the measurements 
arise from multivariate normal populations; but the variance - covariance matrices are 
not identical, quadratic rather than linear multiple discriminant analysis yields the 
optimal solution," [p.723]. They point out that the majority of studies do 
not appear to use tests to establish whether optimal solutions are 
available with the particular data. Applied researchers all too frequently 
do not statistically evaluate the extent to which the ratios of failed and 
non-failed companies have equal variance - covariance matrices. 
Models developed in this manner, they argue, are less than optimal. 
Joy & Tollefson are also critical of the fact that the sampling frames for 
the populations used to develop models are frequently unsatisfactory. 
In using the example of discriminant models which supposedly 
distinguish between good and bad loan applicants, they point out that 
examples of those who have been denied credit are frequently 
excluded. "Sample sizes must also be chosen with recognition that two populations 
are sampled," [p.725]. Although data shortages are frequently a major 
problem for those researching into corporate failure, particularly outside 
the United States of America, it is essential that proper attention be 
paid to the sampling issues. Failure to select random samples will 
merely result in models· that will be highly unlikely to generalise. They 
will, at best, be sample specific. 
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Thirdly Joy & Tollefson take care to point out the difference between ex 
post and ex ante discrimination. The former is achieved when we 
validate a model on a hold out sample taken from the same time 
period. Ex ante prediction involves forecasting within some future time 
period. The earlier discriminant models failed to recognise this 
distinction and provided no valid basis for forecasting. lntertemporal, or 
ex ante validation is a necessary condition of the development of 
forecasting models of corporate distress. 
The same authors also point out that there were misleading 
interpretations of two important aspects of Altman's research. Firstly 
the relative importance of individual variables in Altman's work was 
incorrectly judged by standardising the discriminant coefficients by their 
respective standard errors. They refer readers to the work by Mosteller 
& Wallace, [1963] who developed the correct methodologies. 
Secondly, they examine the methods of evaluating the classification 
efficiency in detail and make suggestions about better methodologies 
here too. The importance of a priori probabilities, and the costs of 
misclassification are discussed in detail. 
Eisenbeis, as a research specialist, had written extensively in the field 
before making his important contribution to the arguments about the 
methodologies involved in the application of multiple discriminant 
analysis to corporate distress, [1977]. He discusses several aspects of 
failure in this critique. 
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The distribution of the variables is his first concern. Violations of the 
multivariate normality assumption "may bias the tests of significance and 
estimated error rates," [p.875]. He surveys the literature on investigations 
into deviations from the multivariate normal distribution including that 
of the use of dichotomous variables. In summarising the work of 
Lachen~ruch, S~eering, and Revo [1973] Eisenbeis points out that "the 
authors concluded that the standard linear procedures may be quite sensitive to 
nonmultivariate normality," [p.876]. He also points out that "they also observed 
that even attempts to adjust for inequalities of the group dispersions by using quadratic 
classification rules did not significantly improve the results, and in many cases were 
worse," [p.877]. Finally he cautions against the unquestioned assumption 
that transformations of the marginal distributions of the ratios to 
normality on the grounds that this will "not necessarily make the joint 
distribution more normal," [p.877], and adds that such transformations "may 
change the interrelationships among the variables and may also affect the relative 
positions ofthe observations in the group," [p.877]. There is no easy solution to 
the question of the extent to which the violation of the multivariate 
normal distribution assumption will invalidate the results of MDA 
models of corporate distress. Pacey and Pham, [1988] assure us that 
the last word has not been written on this matter. ''The requirement of 
multivariate normality of discriminating variables seems critical to the estimation 
procedure. It is an area for further research," [p.15]. In attempting to explain 
some aspects of why models of corporate failure models themselves 
fail, this thesis examines an important facet of this question by 
investigating the extent to which reasonable levels of classification 
accuracy may be achieved with ratios and other variables which are 
univariately but not multivariately distributed. 
THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
CHRISTCHURCH. f\J.Z 
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Eisenbeis also argues that "a second critical assumption of classical linear 
discriminant analysis is that the group dispersion [variance - covariance] matrices are 
equal across all groups," [p.877]. Although he summarises the literature on 
the topic a little more comprehensively than Joy and Tollefson, he adds 
little new material that helps applied researchers analyse the data that 
they do have. It appears that most ratio data from failed and non-failed 
companies do not have equal variance - covariance matrices. 
In discussing the question of the interpretation of the significance of 
individual variables Eisenbeis assures us that "one of the most widely 
misunderstood aspects of discriminant analysis relates to the problem of determining the 
relative importance of individual variables. Unlike the coefficients in the classical linear 
regression model, the discriminant function coefficients are no.t unique; only their ratios 
are," [p.883]. The scene is very confusing to say the least. Eisenbeis, 
Gilbert & Avery [1973) investigated six methods, [they rejected 
suggestions by Mosteller & Wallace and recommended by Joy & 
Tollefson), and concluded "that all the methods for investigating the relative 
importance of variables that had currently been examined have assumed equal 
dispersions," [p.885). This clearly leaves the applied researcher in the dark 
with respect to how to interpret the relative contribution of the 
variables in the model. 
Of primary concern to applied researchers with small samples and a 
large number of potential or actual variables, is the reducing of the 
dimensionality as it is frequently called. Eisenbeis spends some time on 
this topic. "Eisenbeis and Avery [1973] have examined in an heuristic manner the 
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relationship between the significance tests for the equality of group means and the 
problem of investigating group overlap through classification methods. They argue that 
the existence of statistically significant differences among group means, especially when 
the sample sizes are large, does not convey much if any useful information about the 
ability to construct a successful classification scheme," [p.885]. He is critical of the 
attempts to reduce the number of variables because not only is it 
difficult to measure the contribution or significance of individual 
variables, but also because it is difficult to obtain objective measures of 
classification success or otherwise. 
As Eisenbeis notes, "discriminant analysis procedures assume that the groups being 
investigated are discrete and identifiable," [p.887]. Joy & Tollefson also point out 
that defining the two groups in the case of failed and non-failed 
companies may be a very difficult problem. Eisenbeis argues that there 
is a major problem in defining groups when a continuous variable is 
used as the criterion for classification. The cut-off point is usually 
arbitrarily defined. In the case of corporate distress classification and 
prediction the discussion should be extended. If corporate collapse is 
viewed as being on a time continuum, and in the case of some 
companies it is only a matter of time before they collapse, then we 
might question their definition as non-failed companies. They may or 
may not have all of the characteristics of a failed company, but be 
wrongly included in the non-failed group. This problem is overcome if 
sufficient time is allowed before the study is undertaken. 
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A priori probabilities are also discussed at some length by Eisenbeis. 
These probabilities do not influence the determination of the 
discriminant coefficients but they do have a marked influence on the 
cut-off points, [Overall & Klett, 1972]. If the sample proportions are 
used to set the probabilities unsatisfactory or biased cut-off points will 
usually be obtained, particularly as there has been a strong tendency 
for researchers to use equal sample sizes in by far the majority of 
published studies. If population proportions are used then we might 
suppose that this would provide better estimates. The problem with 
this approach is that the sample data is frequently obtained from a 
period spanning more than 20 years. During this time the proportion of 
company failures may vary considerably from year to year as economic 
fortunes fluctuate. Pacey and Pham, [1988], provide a very harsh 
conclusion with respect to a priori probabilities and the ability of MDA 
models to predict corporate collapses. In short they say that multiple 
discriminant models "cannot outperform a naive model which assumes all firms are 
non-bankrupt. The MDA models perform slightly better [than the naive model], but only 
with respect to the period from which the parameters are estimated," [p.15]. The 
possible reasons for this phenomenon will be discussed in chapter two. 
Finally, Eisenbeis briefly summarizes the difficulties in estimating errors 
of classification. Those using the original sample method are "consistent 
but biased", [p.894]. Those using the hold-out sample method are 
unbiased "but require large samples," [p.984]. Those using the population 
method are probably the best, yet the appropriate population 
parameters, that is model specification, might be difficult to establish. 
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Zmijewski [1984] is primarily concerned with the biases that result 
from prediction models developed from non-random samples. 
"Estimating models on such samples can result in biased parameter and probability 
estimates if appropriate estimation techniques are not used," [p.59]. The first point 
that he makes is researchers oversample distressed firms and produce 
what he calls choice-based sample biases. Secondly, Zmijewski argues 
that because applied researchers require certain types of information in 
order to construct discriminant models, those companies from which 
the particular data is unavailable are automatically excluded from the 
sample. "If the probability of distress given complete data is significantly different from 
the probability of distress given incomplete data, the estimated model will be biased," 
[p.74]. The problem relates specifically to that raised earlier by Joy & 
Tollefson. 
Jones [1987] provides something of an updated overview of the 
research methodologies based upon the work of Scott, [1981 ]. His 
survey includes issues which have already been raised in this paper. 
Jones points out that "the more sophisticated models have been based on statistical 
or mathematical literature and have not provided economic guide-lines to aid in 
independent variable selection .... without an economic understanding of bankruptcy, it 
will be difficult to ascertain whether a model developed from data from one set of 
companies is appropriate for predicting the bankruptcy of a company operating in a 
different economic or temporal setting", [p.135]. He also cites Foster [1986] 
and Rose, Andrews and Giroux, [1982] who provide studies into the 
macroeconomic aspects behind the incidence of bankruptcy. Although 
the matter is at least raised by these researchers their models do not 
attempt to integrate the microeconomic aspects with the 
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macroeconomic aspects of corporate failure simultaneously within 
discriminant models. This thesis attempts to provide a rationale and a 
method for doing so. 
In arguing for the adjustment of historical data for ''general or ;pecific price-
level changes", Jones raises an interesting question. Of course ratio data is 
unlikely to be affected by price-level changes unless specific price-
levels impact differently upon various aspects of the financial reports. 
Norton and Smith [1979] confirm this. 
In discussing the question of reducing the variable set, Jones discusses 
the employment of factor analysis to reduce multicollinearity as an 
alternative to the more commonly used stepwise discriminant 
technique. Eisenbeis [1977] argues against variable reduction and in 
doing so implies that, with discriminant analysis, multicollinearity is not 
a major problem, "concern for dimension reduction should follow and not precede 
the development and validation of alternative classification schemes as has been the 
case in most of the applied literature," [p.887]. 
Jones cites various studies which have explored the use of factor 
analysis and notes that many "have identified the same factors and that the 
factors appear to be stable over many years," [p.142]. Jones is hopeful that the 
employment of factor analysis will be fruitful. I am conscious of the 
pitfalls involved. Such a technique is based upon the correlation matrix. 
The first problem with the method is that in small samples, and small 
sample work is by far the more. commonly reported research, it is 
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possible that spurious correlations are obtained because of one 
extreme variable value that may attenuate the statistic. If this is the 
case then the factor analysis will provide misleading results which it 
will be unlikely to replicate. Secondly, in the classification or prediction 
of corporate failure, the main factors, which have been shown to be 
stable, such as those found by Pinches, Mingo & Caruthers, [1973], 
might not be the variables which indicate impending collapse. An 
insignificant variable might not correlate with any other variable and 
therefore in a sense be excluded from the main factor loadings. Yet this 
uncorrelated ratio might provide the key to forecasting collapse. Factor 
analysis, particularly where it identifies stable factors, may provide 
interesting results for some other types of research but it will not 
necessarily solve our problems in the early identification corporate 
collapse. It may be the ratios which are not stable, or the ones that do 
not track with other ratios which provide us with the ability to classify 
or predict impending company failure adequately .. 
Finally, Robertson and Mills [1988] deliver a scathing criticism of 
current practices in the use of MDA models in a wide ranging survey of 
the previous two decades of published research. They are highly critical 
of the reliance on traditional accounting ratios. ''They are sadly out of date .... 
[and they argue that] .... if the traditional ratios did reveal the 'true trends', why 
then do so many companies fail, or decline? Why do so many companies linger on in a 
period of decline before taking action?" [p.71 ]. 
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They emphasize the need "to observe strict mathematical standards," [p.72], 
when using MDA modelling techniques and furthermore argue that "the 
methodology assumes t~at if a model is developed for a particular industry .... [and] .... 
in practice it is difficult to know whether a company does meet a specific industry 
standard," [p.72]. In many cases the concept of an industry is so illusive 
that heterogeneity rather than homogeneity is the dominant feature. 
The problem is even more acute in small economies where at the most 
there might be only two or three companies in a particular industry. 
Robertson and Mills also take Altman to task for his so called 
manufacturing industry study when almost 10 companies out of his 
small sample of 42 cannot be said to belong to that group. 
They are also critical of the manipulation of the cut-off point in MDA 
analysis. ''The cut-off point is not negotiable," [p.73]. It is determined 
mathematically and is optimal for a particular set of data. While I can 
see some justification for what they say , I am unsure of how to judge 
the validity of their argument. It is probable that more research is 
needed, or perhaps more rational argument is needed with respect to 
this point. Their point should, I think, be taken as cautionary at least. 
The same authors also cite research in which subsequent investigators 
have changed or modified the definition of one of the ratios in order to 
simplify the MDA model. "But the ratios cannot be regarded individually. Any 
change to a single ratio has repercussions in the whole model, including the ratios 
contained in the model, the weights and the cut-off," [p.73]. This aspect is 
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explored in detail in this thesis as it is of major importance to the 
continued success or otherwise of MDA model of distress. 
The second part of their paper is devoted to a explanation of their new 
methodology for financial ratio analysis. They argue that the emphasis 
on multivariate models has resulted in "shift away from developing and 
understanding financial ratios .... [and that] .... the new methodology puts forward a 
framework to allow researchers to return to the business of developing financial analysis 
techniques which can be used by businessmen," [p.74]. They argue for a three 
dimensional analysis of ratios. The first is an examination of various 
alternative ways by which similar ratios can be calculated in order to 
identify the ones which have the greatest mean differences between 
the failed and non-failed companies. Secondly, they examine each of 
these in order to estimate what they call "a misclassification score," [p.75], 
and argue for the selection of ratios that have the lowest 
misclassification rates. Finally, they argue for the examination of the 
annual percentage change in each of the ratios. 
There is certainly a need to develop a more satisfactory approach to 
ratio analysis, and indeed model specification. Robertson and Mills 
ideas do sound reasonable, some of which will be explored in this 
particular work, not so much because they are central to this thesis but 
because some of the conclusions of this thesis will reinforce the need 
to concentrate on establishing variables that have means that are 
markedly different for failed and non-failed companies. MDA modelling 
will not be successful unless we can do this. 
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They conclude with an important statement, "that a methodology based upon 
discriminant analysis requires such high levels in application and interpretation that it 
has little chance of being applied correctly in practice," [p.76]. While this 
statement is fundamentally correct; it is demanding, it would seem that 
there might be some ways around some of the problems involved. 
Surely if we are to develop a satisfactory method of predicting the 
extent to which individual companies are likely to collapse, we will 
need to be rigourous. In working on this issue I have attempted to take 
our knowledge a little further down the pathway of being able to build 
better multivariate models. However much researchers may dislike this 
approach, the models will need to be multivariate, for like most 
situations in life, relationships are complex. To argue against the 
collapse on companies being a multivariate phenomenon is to argue for 
a univariate approach. This is even more simplistic than the search for a 
satisfactory multivariate model. I have not set out to find a panacea of 
all of the problems, for indeed there might well be none, but have 
selected a few issues for exploration. These issues are outline_d in the 
next section. 
THE MAIN CONCERNS 
Despite the plethora of criticisms of the use of discriminant analysis in 
classifying or forecasting corporate distress there are some salient 
issues that seem to have been overlooked in the pursuit of more 
suitable statistical approaches. In this thesis I contend that while the 
use of multiple linear discriminant analysis is very exacting, it is still a 
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very useful technique. Furthermore, despite the critical assumptions of 
multivariate normal distributions and the equality of the variance -
covariance matrices we can bend the rules a little provided that we 
understand what is happening. We should understand these limitations 
quite clearly as to fail to do so leads to the producing of models of 
corporate failure that will themselves fail rapidly either over time, or 
even over subsequent application to sample companies from the 
original population in the same time period. There is no panacea of all 
ills in this matter, but all is not so dramatically lost as many critics 
might lead us to believe. 
The question of a priori probabilities has largely been ignored in the 
discriminant modelling of corporate failure, [Deakin 1977]. Altman and 
Levalle [1981] mention it in their paper on Canadian business failure 
but sidestep the problem by implying that it is too difficult. This is 
unacceptable because these probabilities are frequently relevant to the 
development of the models. Altman does attempt to ·use a priori 
probabilities in his Loan and Savings model [1977] but reports no 
significant improvement in an already very successful model. Overall 
and Klett [1972], and Deakin [1977] discuss briefly, but nevertheless 
very graphically, the perils of ignoring the question. Statistical 
inferences based upon models which have ignored such a priori 
probabilities, however, may be very misleading, Uoy & Tollefson, 1975]. 
Of the two important assumptions behind the multiple linear 
discriminant model, that of the equivalence of the variance - covariance 
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matrices for the failed and non-failed companies is sometimes very 
critical. It appears that most researchers in this field do not even 
evaluate the extent to which their data meets the assumptions of 
multivariate normality and the equivalence of the variance - covariance 
matrices, Uoy & Tolefson, 1975]. Some models show that even when 
using linear discriminant analysis, with unequal variance - covariance 
matrices, as opposed to the quadratic model, the predictive power is 
excellent. Chapter two explores the question of the interaction 
between a priori probabilities ·and unequal variance - covariance 
matrices and discusses why some models predict quite satisfactorily 
when a priori probabilities are ignored and why others do not. 
Mean ratios change from time to time, either because of sampling error 
or because mean ratios from one time period may differ from those of 
another period. Because MDA techniques basically operate off mean 
differences, changing mean differences between the ratios of failed and 
non-failed companies may create particular difficulties. Such variations 
may result in a different distribution of z-scores and thus our 
interpretation of them will also need to change. In an attempt to 
explore the affect of such mean variable changes, chapter three 
investigates the interaction between minor changes in mean ratio 
differences, a priori probabilities and unequal variance - covariance 
matrices. 
As already discussed, the assumption of multivariate normally 
distributed data seems to be important, however, chapter four uses 
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many very large simulated ratio data bases to investigate the question 
of using multivariate linear discriminant modelling with unvariately 
normally distributed data. This was done in order to examine the extent 
to which the breach of the multivariate normality assumption reduces 
the ability to discriminate between failing and non-failing companies. 
At first glance, the sample and "hold-out" sample method of evaluating 
models of corporate failure seems to be a very enticing strategy, 
particularly given the researcher's desire to replicate findings in a 
scientific manner. Despite its very wide-spread appeal, this approach is 
far less efficient than using the full sample to estimate the population 
discriminant coefficients. This issue is reported in chapter five. 
Multivariate statistical models need to be correctly specified. If they are 
misspecified, a vast array of problems occur in the estimation of the 
parameters. For example, macroeconomic variables have not been 
used as an integral part of MDA models. The shortage of adequate data 
obliges many researchers to develop multivariate linear discriminant 
models using information collected over a number of years. Frequently 
problems are encountered when applying and evaluating models in 
another time period. These models have invariably been 
microeconomic models which at the very best have recognised that 
ratios are industry specific. The debt ratio for a finance company is 
expected to be markedly different from that of a manufacturing 
. company. Researchers have attempted to circumvent this problem by 
carefully selecting homogeneous samples. The problem, however, is 
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more critical than this. A debt ratio of 85%, for example, may be 
unacceptable in one economic climate, but indicate no impending 
problems in another. Deakin [1972] built models for different time 
periods and in the same paper pointed out that ratios, and therefore 
the discriminant coefficients themselves, vary over time. Some of the 
focus of the research needs to move to the macroeconomic level. King 
[1966] showed that the macroeconomic environment was important to 
share prices and although it is discussed briefly elsewhere in the 
literature [Foster 1986], this context has largely been ignored by 
researchers using the MDA approach to classifying and forecasting 
corporate failure. Although developing a comprehensive MDA model 
using macroeconomic variables lies outside the domain of this 
particular research, chapter six explores a method by which 
macroeconomic variables might be incorporated. It also briefly explores 
the need for lagged variables, distributed lags, and the need for 
indicators of change, such as first differences to be developed as part of 
the modelling process. More careful attention needs to be paid to 
correctly specifying MDA models as misspecification will usually fatally 
destroy any model. 
The last chapter, chapter seven, summarises each of the issues in 
relation to their relative importance. The relative importance of the 
issues is divided into two section; those of critical importance, and 
those of lesser importance. Surprisingly, the issue of the extent to 
which the data in multivariately normally distributed and the extent to 
which the respective variance - covariance matrices are equal are 
judged to be of lesser importance. Model specification, followed by the 
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need for random sampling, effective and efficient use of the sample 
data, the need for stable mean vectors, the need for significant mean 
differences, and the need for ex ante validation are held to be the most 
critical for model development. 
Although the use of MDA models has declined in recent years the 
central theme of this research is that their use is by no means obsolete. 
The technique must be used with caution and in the full knowledge of 
the effect of any breach of the assumptions and other sampling issues. 
It is clear that its naive use will lead to a naive model which will not 
stand any test of time despite the fact that they might seem to fit a data 
set with a high degree of discriminatory power at the time. 
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Chapter Two 
THE INTERACTION OF A PRIORI PROBABILITIES AND UNEQUAL 
VARIANCE- COVARIANCE MATRICES IN CORPORATE DISTRESS 
MODELLING. 
INTRODUCTION: 
This chapter addresses the use of a priori probabilities of group 
membership and the interaction of such probabilities with equal and 
unequal variance - covariance matrices as an important issue in MDA 
modelling of corporate distress. Despite wide spread debate over the 
matter, a priori probabilities of corporate failure are frequently 
disregarded in favour of an apparently more pragmatic approach. This 
philosophy is usually characterised by an expression such as, "Well it 
discriminates doesn't it? Why not just use it?". Sometimes ignoring a 
priori probabilities in developing MDA models appears create few 
problems, if any at all. This paper focuses upon the question of when 
and why a priori probabilities of company failure are able to be quite 
safely ignored. It also focuses upon the dangers of doing so. While the 
ignoring of a priori probabilities does not influence the estimates of the 
population discriminant coefficients when the respective variance -
covariance matrices for failed and non-failed companies are equal, 
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[Lachenbruch, 1975], [although this is not the case when MDA 
techniques are applied to unequal variance - covariance matrices], it 
does create a problem when cut-off points are selected. Other less 
formal techniques are usually employed, such as trial and error 
approaches to cut-off points, and the a priori probability method, the 
correct method, [Overall & Klett, 1972; Deakin,1977], is usually 
dropped. It usually dropped because, quite contrary to theory, it 
frequently appears to be irrelevant. Many empirical models seem to 
indicate that a priori probabilities are unimportant. In accepting this 
argument researchers have overlooked two important issues. Firstly, 
they have not explained why a priori probabilities are irrelevant, and 
secondly, and more importantly, I believe, they tend to have overlooked 
the main objective of the research that they are undertaking. They tend 
to fail to recognise that any statistical research uses samples in order to 
estimate the population parameters. The population distributions of the 
z-scores of failed and non-failed companies are of vital importance. 
A PRIORI PROBABILITIES OF FAILURE AND NON-FAILURE. 
A priori probabilities of group membership are defined as the probability 
that a randomly selected observation will belong to one of the groups 
under study. If, in the case of corporate distress modelling, a randomly 
selected company has a So/o chance of being a failed company, within 
say the next 12 months for example, it is because So/o of the companies 
in the total population will fail within that time period. Forecasting this 
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figure with a reasonable degree of accuracy might seem be difficult as it 
will vary from year to year, but Rose, Andrews and Giroux [1982] have 
shown that this is able to be predicted on a quarterly basis in the United 
States. 
A priori probabilities of group membership determines the positioning of 
the cut-off point on the z-score numberline, [Overall & Klett, 1972]. In 
the literature on corporate failure classification/prediction, the use of a 
priori probabilities is almost always neglected in favour of an arbitrary 
choice of a cut-off which seems to best fit the sample data. Robertson 
and Mills [1988] argue that in any particular data set, the cut-off point is 
determined mathematically and is therefore not "negotiable." Although 
the question of a priori probabilities has been addressed fairly 
thoroughly by the critics in more recent times, it was completely ignored 
in the early literature on corporate failure. Researchers using MDA 
techniques have been able to ignore this concept in some cases and still 
obtain satisfactory classification models, [e.g. Altman & Levalle, 1981]. 
Rising pressure in the literature has obliged researchers to confront the 
issue. The question of why some model builders have been able to 
ignore a priori probabilities and yet produce seemingly satisfactory 
models has not been adequately explained. This chapter attempts to do 
so. 
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VARIANCE· COVARIANCE EQUALITY 
Not all company ratio data conforms to the ideal variance - covariance 
equality criterion. In fact, it appears that little, if any, of the data does. If 
we examine various conditions one at a time, ceterus parubus, we 
should be able to identify the circumstances under which we can 
reasonably depart from this particular formal assumption of MDA. We 
should then be able to identify the specific circumstances under which 
our attempts to classify or predict are more likely to succeed. A series of 
graphs developed from a series of simulations produces contrasting 
situations. These should enable us to identify the critical factor quite 
clearly. There are standardised three cases which .require analysis; the 
equality of variance - covariance matrices for failed and non-failed 
companies, the situation where the variance - covariance matrix of failed 
companies is generally larger than that of non-failed companies, and 
finally, the case where the variance - covariance matrix of non-failed 
companies is generally greater than that of failed companies. Each case 
. needs to be examined in turn as each provides us with a special set of 
circumstances. The situation in reality however, may be even more 
confusing as some variances and covariances may be larger than those 
of the other group while the opposite may be the case for other 
variables. The three extreme cases should allow us to observe the 
trends. 
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SITUATION 1: LINEAR DISCRIMINATE ANALYSIS WITH EQUAL 
VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRICES. 
If the variance - covariance matrices are equal the z-scores of both 
groups will have the same dispersion, i.e., the same standard deviation. 
[This matter is addressed more thoroughly in chapter three.] We can 
now examine two typical situations. The first, Case A, where the means 
vectors of ratios are moderately well separated and hence the centroids, 
[i.e., the respective group z-score means], of the groups will be 
moderately well separated also, and Case B, where the means are 
markedly well separated. In this latter example the centroids of both 
groups will be well separated in this case. 
CASE A Means only moderately well separated. 
Even a cursory reading of the literature will show that the sample sizes 
of failed companies is usually matched, or fairly closely so, with those of 
the non-failed firms, [Altman, 1968, 1977; Deakin, 1972, 1977; Elam, 
1975;Norton & Smith, 1979; et.al]. We can simulate this situation by 
graphing the data to show an hypothetical distribution of the sample z-
scores for non-failing companies compared with those of failed 
companies on its left. The means, or group centroids, are different at 30 
and 20 respectively, and the standard deviations are identical. Although 
there is clearly an area of overlap in the z-scores, the associated 
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discriminant function discriminates moderately well at a cut-off score of 
25. Figure 1 reflects this type of situation. 
FIG.1: Equal Covariances 
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A company with a z-score of 20, for example, has a very high probability 
of belonging to the failed group of companies because the ordinate of 
the failed group at this point is much higher than that of the non-failed 
group. However, the equal sample sizes can easily mask the true 
situation. 
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If we now begin to adjust the sample data for the a priori probabilities, 
or population proportions, the trend begins to emerge. If we hold the 
means constant and assume that 30o/o of the company population are 
failing firms, the population distributions show that we begin to lose the 
ability to discriminate. If we now compare the first and second graphs 
we can see that a significantly larger proportion of the failed firms now 
have z-scores which are overlapped by the distribution of the z-scores of · 
the non-failed firms. 
FIG.2: Equal Covari ances 
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Although still highly likely to belong to the failed group of companies, a 
company with a z-score of 20 is much less likely to belong to this group 
because the respective population ordinates change as adjustment is 
made for a priori probabilities. 
International statistics reveal that far fewer than 30% of registered 
companies fail in any one year. The figure ranges between about one 
and eight percent, depending on how we define our population. If for 
the purposes of this discussion we assume a much more realistic a 
priori probability of about 1 Oo/o for failed companies the situation is 
clearly displayed. Our population model of corporate failure based upon 
equal sample sizes now begins to fail quite dramatically. Type I errors 
are noticeably larger than Type II errors. 
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FIG.3: Equal Covariances 
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Now with a z-score of 20, a company is more likely to belong to the non-
failed group. 
Despite our having what at first appears to be a reasonable model of 
corporate failure based upon the hypothetical sample data, what we are 
left with, once we have estimated the respective population 
distributions, is much less satisfactory. In other words, although we may 
have matched pairs in our sample, and although the statistics, such as 
the F ratio, the Lambda and the Mahalanobis 0-squared, appear to be 
satisfactory, the failure to adjust for a priori probabilities, and the failure 
to attempt to produce some sort of estimate of the respective 
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population distributions, leads to unacceptable errors. Type I errors 
increase even more dramatically. This is not so say that our initial model 
is entirely useless. It is a much better predictor of sound companies. 
This might be sufficient for our particular purposes, but it provides an 
unsatisfactory model for predicting/classifying the failed companies. 
While these examples tend to point us in the direction of an answer to 
the question of why mpdels of corporate failure fail to predict 
themselves, the situation is not necessarily a hopeless one. If we retain 
the assumptions of multivariate normality and the equivalence of the 
variance - covariance matrices, and examine the case where the 
centroids are well separated, we should gain further insights into why 
they may in fact succeed. 
CASE B Means markedly well separated. 
Where the mean vectors of ratios are markedly well separated there is 
clear discrimination at the sample level because the optimal linear 
transformation produces clusters of z-scores whose means are also 
markedly well separated. The simulated sample data shows this quite 
clearly when graphed. With the means or centroids at 20 and 40 
respectively there is very little overlap. Misclassification is minimal. 
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FIG.4: Equal Covariances 
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As we move through to a 30% a priori probability our ability to 
discriminate between the two possible outcomes is not lost or reduced. 
The failing companies stand out very clearly as having low z-scores while 
the zone of confusion, or the zone of ignorance, as Altman called it, 
remains very small indeed. 
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FIG.5: Equal Covariances 
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Finally, when we move to a failure rate of 1 Oo/o, the discrimination in the 
population is almost perfect. The degree of overlap between the 
distributions is very small indeed. Clearly those companies with low z-
scores are the failing companies. 
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FIG.6: Equal Covariances 
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In summary, the standard deviations of the z-scores are equal because 
the variance - covariance matrices are equal. The vectors of mean ratios 
are sufficiently well separated to allow excellent discrimination. The 
extent of discriminatory power is not severely restricted by the failure to 
use a priori probabilities, and both Type I and II errors remain relatively 
small and approximately equal. 
So far we have assumed the equality of the variance - covariance 
matrices and thus equal dispersion for each group of z-scores. If we now 
relax this assumption, and this is much more frequently the case in 
empirical work, then the z-scores themselves will be distributed 
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differently,[this aspect is the subject of more detailed analysis in chapter 
three]. While the general literature provides studies that use a quadratic 
discriminant model, (Eisenbeis, 1977), many researchers into corporate 
distress classification/prediction have shown that they can continue to 
use the MDA model quite successfully. What is the effect of this, and, to 
what extent can we discriminate under these conditions, despite the fact 
that we might ignore a priori probabilities? 
Again we need to examine two possible generalised cases. Firstly we will 
examine the situation where the variance-covariance matrix of the failed 
companies is larger than that of the non-failed companies. In this case 
then the standard deviation of the z-scores of the failed companies will 
be larger than that of the non-failed companies. 
SITUATION II: VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX OF FAILED GROUP 
IS GREATER THAN THAT OF THE NON-FAILED GROUP. 
CASE C - Means only moderately well separated. 
As we did in case A where the variance-covariance matrices for both 
groups were equal, we commence with equal sample sizes and different 
means, except that we now assume that variance- covariance matrix of 
the failed companies is the larger and thus the dispersion of the z-scores 
for the failed companies will also be the larger. Although there are 
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almost an infinite set of possibilities it will be sufficient for the purposes 
of this argument to follow through one hypothetical case. 
Commencing with equal sample s•zes, multivariate normality, and 
different centriods, and with the mean vectors of ratios being 
significantly different, the sample distributions will appear as portrayed in 
figure 7. 
FIG.7:Covariance Failed >Non-failed Cos 
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The means are 20 and 30 respectively and the two sample distributions 
intersect at two points. Z-scores lying between these two intersection 
points are more likely to belong to companies which are likely to 
succeed, although there is a very large degree of overlap. 
Now as we move towards a significantly lower proportion of failing 
companies in the total population, the population distributions of failed 
and non-failed companies will tend to merge as shown in Figure 8. 
FIG.8:Covariance Failed >Non-failed Cos 
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Discrimination is still possible at both ends of the z-score scale, although 
it might not be deemed worthwhile at the lower end. Again as we move 
to a much more realistic 1 Oo/o company failure rate the use of the model 
becomes much more tenuous. 
FIG.9:Covariance Failed >Non-failed Cos 
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The final scenario shows that when the a priori probability of company 
failure is at the 1 Oo/o level there is very little basis for discrimination at all. 
Although it might argued that the model is useful at the lower values, 
this would depend on the costs of misclassitication. At the cut-off point 
the Type I errors are much larger than the Type II errors. The possibility 
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of misclassifying a failed firm as a non-failed firm is much larger than the 
converse. 
At the point of intersection, where the two distributions meet, the 
ordinates of both groups are equal. An examination of figures 7,8 & 9 
shows that this point of intersection moves progressively towards the 
left as adjustment for a priori probabilities is made. 
CASED- Means well separated 
Now if we recommence with the same situation as in Case C, except 
with mean vectors of ratios which are well separated, the resultant 
centroids will also be well separated. With z-score means of 20 and 40 
respectively the sample distributions show that a fairly sound basis of 
classification/prediction can be achieved. Type I errors remain larger 
than the Type II errors. 
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FIG.1 O:Covariance Failed >Non-failed Co 
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The next simulation shows that the model is fairly robust. As we move 
to a 30% rate of company failure the cut-off point has moved slightly to 
the left and is positioned at a z-score of approximately 30. If anything, 
there appears to be a slightly better ability to discriminate between the 
two groups. 
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FIG.11 :Covariance Failed >Non-failed Co 
0.13 
Probability of Failure = 0.3 
0.12 
0.11 
0.1 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0 
0 20 40 60 
Distribution of Z-Scores 
- Failed Cos + Non-foiled Cos. 
At the 1 Oo/o level of company failure in the population we still have clear 
discrimination, although perhaps not as dramatic as sho~n in the two 
previous graphs. Clearly, there is no lack of discriminatory power. Type I 
errors are still larger than Type II errors. 
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FIG.12:Covariance Failed >Non-failed Co 
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Where the mean vectors of ratios are not so well separated, the ability to 
discriminate is, as we well know, always limited. As the mean vectors of 
ratios separate, our ability to discriminate increases. Where the variance-
covariance matrix for failed companies is larger than of non-failed 
companies, i.e., where the dispersion of the raw score ratios is greater, 
the dispersion of z-scores will also be greater for non-failed companies. 
This will result in more Type I errors than Type .11 errors as we will 
predict that relatively more failing companies to be non-failing in error. 
Compare figures 3 and 9, and 6 and 9, for example. In both cases where 
the mean vectors are well separated, the percentage of Type I errors 
diminishes. We now need to examine the situation where there is a 
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greater dispersion amongst the ratios of the non-failed group of 
companies. 
SITUATION Ill: VARIANCE - COVARIANCE MATRIX OF NON-FAILED 
GROUP IS GREATER THAN THAT OF THE FAILED GROUP. 
Because the dispersion of the ratios amongst the non-failed companies 
is greater than that of the failed companies, the dispersion of the z-
scores will also tend to be greater. This is the condition we are more 
likely to find in the real world. One of the problems with discriminant 
type research is that companies which do not appear to be failing 
frequently have a very wide dispersion of ratios. These when treated in a 
u,nivariate sense provide a poor basis for prediction as on occasions, 
many of those non-failing companies have very poor ratios -yet do not 
fail. Unfortunately this problem is not always able to be solved by using 
multivariate statistical techniques. 
CASE E - Means only moderately well separated. 
As we follow the same series of stages in cases C and D, figure 13 
reflects the sample distributions. In this case however, Type II errors are 
significantly greater than Type I errors. That is, the probability of 
misclassifying non-failed companies as failed companies is much greater 
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because of the wider dispersion of the non-failed company ratios, and 
hence the wider dispersion of the z-scores. 
FIG.13:Covariance Failed <Non-failed Co 
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Only very modest discrimination is possible with a cut-off point of 
approximately 25. We may or may not regard our model as satisfactory 
depending on our specific objectives. If we now start to progressively 
estimate the respective population distributions by assuming an a priori 
probability of failure of 30o/o we have a markedly reduced ability to 
discriminate. 
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FIG.14:Covariance Failed <Non-failed Co 
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Finally, figure 15 shows that we have lost all discriminant power 
altogether. If we rely upon the model alone we will merely predict that 
all companies in the population will fall into the non-failing group. We do 
not need a discriminant model to demonstrate this feature. There is now 
a dramatic change in the Type I and Type II errors. The sample data 
showed a marked bias towards Type II errors. The population 
distribution reflects the converse. The sample data by itself is unable to 
correctly reflect types of errors. Type I errors now exist. Type II errors do 
not. 
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FIG.15:Covariance Failed <Non-failed Co 
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We need not restrict ourselves quite so harshly in reality. The models do 
identify a set of companies which require closer attention. This would 
require the identification of other discriminating variables as the ratios 
incorporated in the model provide only a partial discrimination. Clearly 
more information, i.e., a better model specification, possibly of a non-
ratio type, is required before the model would discriminate. 
CASE F - Means well separated 
Our final set of scenarios provides for a much better distinction between 
the mean vectors of the ratios than Case E provided. Figure 16 shows 
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the situation in which there is a fairly satisfactory discrimination in the 
sample data. Type II errors are significantly larger than those of a Type I 
nature. 
FIG.16:Covariance Failed <Non-failed Co 
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As we move to an a priori probability of failure at the 30% level, the 
model becomes much less satisfactory. Figure 17 shows this quite 
dramatically. It is a preferable situation to that shown in figure 14. 
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FIG.17:Covariance Failed <Non-failed Co 
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Finally figure 18 shows that we have lost most of our discriminatory 
power in the situation in which the probability of failure is 1 Oo/o. 
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FIG.18:Covariance Failed <Non-failed Co 
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The situation in which we would achieve the kind of unsatisfactory 
results shown in Figures 15 and 18 is one in which there are many 
companies with a wide dispersion in their ratios ranging from excellent 
to very poor. For some reason, other than that which is reflected in the 
data, a significant proportion do not fail, and others do. In this case we 
would need to search for an additional variable or variables in order to 
improve our model's specification. Our model is inadequate as it is. If we 
extend this analysis by separating the mean vectors even further we 
would be able to produce a model which does discriminate under these 
particular conditions. This may take us into the realm of absurdity where 
the discriminant model is merely telling us the obvious. 
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CONCLUSION. 
Sample derived multiple linear discriminant models of corporate failure 
may fail to correctly classify the population if a priori probabilities are not 
taken into account. The conclusions to be drawn are quite simple, but 
important. 
1. It is important to identify the population distribution of z-scores for 
failed and non-failed companies. A priori probabilities should be used in 
this process. 
2. The effect of using a priori probabilities is to move the cut-off point [if 
one exists] in the direction of the z-scores representing failed 
companies. 
3. In the case of equal variance - covariance matrices, the extent to 
which clear discrimination is able to be achieved after a priori 
probabilities are taken into account, is a function of the significance of 
the difference between the respective mean vectors of ratios. Where 
mean ratio vectors are sufficiently well separated, the discriminant 
function will classify with a high degree of accuracy irrespective of the 
equality or inequality of the variance - covariance matrices. 
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4. Where the variance - covariance matrix for failed companies is larger 
than that of the non-failed companies, equal sample size models will 
exaggerate our ability to discriminate, unless the mean vectors of ratios 
are well separated. Even then there may be a loss of discriminatory 
power. In this case there is an increased likelihood of Type I errors, i.e., 
we will classify a larger percentage of failing companies as non-failures in 
error. 
5. Where the variance- covariance matrix for the non-failed companies 
is larger than that of the failed companies, equal sample size models 
may mislead us even more dramatically. In this case there is an 
increased likelihood of Type II errors, i.e., we- will classify a large 
percentage of non-failed companies as being likely failures in error. The 
sample data alone will not allow a correct estimate of Types I and II 
errors to be made 
It is clear that care should be taken to observe any inequalities in the 
variance - covariance matrices in research into linear discriminant 
models of corporate distress. As already mentioned this will not always 
lead to clear solutions as some of the elements of the respective 
matrices may be equal, as others may be larger and others may be 
smaller. At this stage it would seem that more effort should be spent on 
identifying ratios that discriminate in a univariate sense [i.e., mean 
differences should be significant) before we plunge into multivariate 
techniques. If we cannot find such ratios, we cannot build multivariate 
linear discriminant models. Both univariate and multivariate tests of the 
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significance between the means and the mean vectors should be 
applied. The matter of the interaction of a priori probabilities and 
unequal variance - covariance matrices however becomes even more 
critical as we examine minor differences in mean ratios for one of the 
groups. This matter is explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
THE INTERACTION OF MINOR CHANGES IN MEAN RATIO 
DIFFERENCES, A PRIORI PROBABILITIES AND UNEQUAL VARIANCE-
COVARIANCE MATRICES. 
INTRODUCTION: 
The preceding chapter introduced the argument with respect to the 
interaction between the a priori probabilities and the variance -
covariance matrices and the significance of the difference between the 
vector of mean ratios or other variables. This chapter attempts to add to 
the rationale for that set of arguments and develop the ideas and 
implications further. Unequal variance - covariance matrices for the 
ratios of failed and non-failed companies affect the estimate of the 
population discriminant function in two respects. Firstly, if the sample 
sizes for both groups are equal, or approximately equal, as is the case 
with most published MDA research in corporate distress, and the actual 
incidence of failure is markedly different in the population, then this will 
result in a biased estimate of the discriminant coefficients. This is not the 
case when the variance - covariance matrices are equal however. 
Secondly, when the discriminant coefficients are applied to the original 
data of the two groups, the variance, or the standard deviations of the z-
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scores for both groups will be different. This variance may lead us to 
misinte.rpret both the statistics and the individual z-scores themselves. 
Finally, this chapter examines the extent to which MDA techniques are 
-
sensitive to changes in mean ratios and explores the implications that 
this sensitivity might have for ex ante or intertemporal validation. 
THE PROBLEM: 
From period to period the mean ratios of failed and non-failed companies 
usually vary, [e.g. Deakin 1977; Lev 1974]. For those developing linear 
discriminant models of corporate distress this phenomenon should lead 
to caution, because, as the mean ratios of a single group offailed or non-
failed companies change, either through time as industry norms are well 
known to do, through either sampling error, or measurement error, 
quite definite changes take place in the estimates of the population 
parameters involved. These occur because MDA techniques are very 
much driven off mean differences and off the group means themselves. 
This part of the research into why models of corporate failure 
themselves fail, particularly when applied to intertemporal data, 
investigates the exact nature of the changes in the estimates of the 
statistical parameters under controlled conditions. A series of questions 
related to this issue were asked. 
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EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS: 
In the event of a mean ratio of orie of the groups of failed or non-failed 
companies changing, for whatever reason, what happens to the 
estimates of the population parameters in MDA models? 
Secondly, what happens if during this process a priori probabilities of 
group membership are infroduced? 
Thirdly, if during this process the respective variance - covariance 
matrices diverge, thus breaking the equality assumption, what happens 
to the estimates of the population parameters in MDA models of 
corporate distress? 
Fourthly, what are the implications of the findings? 
Several numerical simulations were modelled and as the results were 
similar only one numerical example is cited here. This example 
sufficiently generalises the findings. 
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THE EXPERIMENTS: 
Two sets of simulation experiments were carried out in order to observe 
the specific effects of variations in a sample mean ratio for a single 
group, in this case that of non-failed companies. The observed pattern of 
behaviour would be the same if the a m·ean ratio of the failed companies 
was changed. The first set of simulations assumed equal variance -
covariance matrices, and the second assumed that the variance -
covariance matrix for the non-failed companies was larger than that of 
the other. The non-failed group of companies was used to simulate the 
case of the large variance - covariance matrix on the assumption that 
non-failing companies were more likely to have larger ratio variances. 
This research did not set out to investigate the empirical validity of the 
assumption as it is not important to the argument. The question is 
important to subsequent research however. 
During experimentation the sample sizes were adjusted to allow for a 
priori probabilities of group membership which might reflect the 
population from which the sample was drawn. Because much research 
in the corporate distress modelling area uses equal sub-sample sizes, 
the experimentation process commences at this point. 
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DEFINITIONS: 
The vector of sample means were defined as:-
Means of Failed Companies = 
Means of Non-failed Companies = 
The respective variance - covariance matrices are defined as:-
the variance - covariance matrix for failed companies 
and the variance - covariance matrix for non-failed companies 
= Enf 
The respective sample sizes were defined as:-
nf and nnf respectively. 
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The vector of non-standardised discriminant coefficients are defined as:-
where E p is the pooled variance - covariance matrix. 
and ·where d is the vector of mean differences where 
ESTIMATING THE POPULATION VARIANCE· COVARIANCE MATRIX: 
MDA techniques assume that the underlying variance - covariance 
matrices are identical and that deviations from this are due to sampling 
errors. Whether or not this is a valid assumption depends upon the 
particular sub-populations or groups being investigated. From the 
sample data, the respective variance - covariance matrices are 
computed, and the assumed population matrix is computed by a 
pooling or weighted average method. The normal practice of pooling the 
respective variance - covariance matrices is usually carried out as 
follows: 
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If there are minor differences between E f and E nf the matter is of little 
importance but the problem is·that when the sampling proportions are 
markedly different from those found in the actual population being 
studied, we have a biased estimate of the pooled variance - covariance 
matrix because the pooling weights are determined by the respective 
sub-sample sizes. This in turn produces a bias in our estimates of the z-
scores for failed and non-failed companies under certain circumstances 
and reduces our ability to discriminate satisfactorily. 
Experiment 1: 
Given that }:f = }:nf = 
The number of ratios = 2, and nf = nnf = SO 
Mf j3.001 
L1.ooj 
Mnf I 0! 1 
L2.ooJ 
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where a is varied from -1.00 to 7.00 
Successive simulations involved varying the sampling proportions as 
follows: 
nf = 40 nnf = 60 
nf = 20 nnf = 80 
nf = 10 nnf = 90 
nf =OS nnf = 95 
The numerous observations were recorded during the simulations may 
be classified into two groups. The first set relate to the cases where the 
respective variance - covariances are equal, and the second to situations 
where the matrices are unequal. The critical observations are 
summarised as follows. 
1: EQUAL VARIANCE· COVARIANCE MATRICES: 
Observation 1:1. 
As the mean of a single ratio for the non-failed companies group 
increases, the discriminant coefficients both change in opposite 
directions to each other because there is a kind of trade-off between the 
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two. Although this particular aspect cannot be generalised, as in some 
cases both coefficients decrease or increase together, both of these 
changes are always linear, Figure 3.1. 
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As the mean of X,, of non-failed companies increases the corresponding 
discriminant coefficient b1 reduces in magnitude. Simultaneously the 
discriminant coefficient b2 is enhanced. The coefficients relating to these 
changes appear to be a function of the inverse of the variance -
covariance matrices but as the matter appeared to hold little of value to 
the central purpose of this thesis the idea was not pursued. The 
particular linear model for both of these linear changes is:-
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= 1.375 - 0.375Mnf1 
= -1.250 + 0.250Mnf1 
Although more research into this matter could be useful it appears that 
these linear functions are unique to the specific data set. Again, although 
more research into this matter could be of interest to mathematical 
statisticians, it would seem to have little direct interest to those wishing 
to develop MDA models of corporate distress. It is however important to 
recognise that there is a trade-off between the discriminant coefficients 
. as the mean ratio of one particular group changes. 
The implications of these changing coefficients, particularly in what 
might be termed, the critical zone, where, in this example, M1 lies 
between 3.00 and 5.00, are of particular importance. Not only do small 
differences in a single mean ratio change both of the discriminant 
coefficients, but within this range, the respective signs change as well. 
This means that if, by chance, we select a sample that provided slightly 
different means from another sample, and to a large extent this would 
be function of the variance of that particular ratio in the population of 
companies, we would be inclined to give a markedly different 
interpretation of the discriminant model. This means that in small 
sample based research into corporate distress we are constantly in 
danger of developing sample specific models with relatively large 
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standard errors. Other samples from the same population, with slightly 
different mean ratios. will produce significantly different discriminant 
models. While at other points, say where the mean of X1 was 1.0 in the 
example, the rate of change in the coefficients would be the same as the 
functions are linear, yet, the interpretation would not be markedly 
different. A similar change in the mean ratio would not cause the model 
to have sign changes thus our explanation of the way in which the ratios 
related· to company failure would also not be changed. Clearly more 
research is needed on this issue but the significance of the trend should 
be clear. 
Observation 1:2 
As the mean of a single ratio for the non-failed company group increases, 
the centroids of the non-standardised z-scores also change. The centroid 
of the failed group changed [reduced in this specific case] in a linear 
manner while the centroid of the non-failed group changed in a 
quadratic manner, Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 
Change in Centroids 
[as a function of a change in o mean] 
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This linear function is: 
Failed companies' centroid = 2.875 - 0.8?SM1 
and the quadratic function is 
Non~failed companies' centroid = -2.50 + 1.8?SM1 - 0.375M12 
7 
Although these functions would appear to be interrelated in some way 
they also appear to be unique to the specific data. This matter requires 
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further research in order to identify the nature of this possible 
interrelationship, however, as it did not appear to be of importance to 
MDA model builders researching into corporate collapses, the matter 
was not pursued further. The trends, however, are important. 
As the mean ratio changed, the centroids also changed. The centroids of 
the failed and non-failed companies' z-scores tend towards convergence 
as the value of the mean ratio of the non-failed group tends towards that 
of the mean ratio of the failed group of companies. This is logical as 
when the two mean ratios are equal the particular variable would not 
contribute to the discriminatory power of the model. In the same vein, 
as the two means diverge, so to do the centroids and thus the quality of 
discrimination improves. 
Of critical importance here is, that even when the variance - covariance 
matrices are equal, the MDA technique is very sensitive to changing 
mean ratio data within particular ranges. Within some ranges the 
discriminatory power is enhanced or reduced by a significant amount 
depending upon the magnitude of the difference of the between mean 
ratios of the two groups. Again this is particularly critical where the mean 
ratios might have large standard errors. The sampling error is a function 
of both the sample size and the standard deviation, and there is an 
additional source of error and movement to be found in changes of 
accounting policies as well. This might point to the necessity of having a 
much closer look at the individual mean ratios and their associated 
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standard errors. It is vitally important to ensure that the mean vectors 
are first-rate estimates of the population mean vectors, and hence 
random sampling becomes important, because the estimates of the 
discriminant coefficients and the respective group centroids are 
completely dependent upon this. It is difficult to over-state this point. 
More research is needed into the question of MDA modelling of 
corporate distress in this area because of the sensitivity of the technique 
to small changes within certain mean ranges. At this juncture I would be 
inclined to speculate that if the sample estimates of the population 
means have relatively high standard errors, and this may be a matter of 
judgement or opinion, then it is probably n9t worthwhile developing 
MDA models. It might be possible to enhance the precision of particular 
models by excluding mean ratios with high standard errors, because as 
indicator variables, they are too unstable. 
Observation 1:3 
Now if we subtract the quadratic from the linear equation we obtain a 
measure of the distance between the two centroids. This is the 
Mahalanobis o2• This provides the function 
= 5.375 - 2.75M1 + 0.375M1 2 
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The usefulness of this function is that we can observe the change in the 
separation of the centroids and in this case, [figure 3.:3], can observe 
that between M, = 3 and M, = 4 there is only a small separation 
between the group centroids. Discrimination here is very poor. 
Figure 3:3 
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Observation 1:4 
The standard deviation of the failed, [Szf], the non-failed, [Sznd, and the 
total sample of all companies z-scores,[ Szts1, are equal and change in a 
non-linear manner also. That is: 
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Szt = = 
Figure 3:4 
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This is to be expected as Szts is the root function of o2• Because of the 
equality of the respective variance - covariance matrices, and as the 
respective standard deviation of the z-scores are a function of these 
matrices and the three standard deviations of the z-scores are equal. 
Szt = b' Et b 
Sznf = b'!; nf b 
Page 3:17 
= 
Where .E f equals .E nf then it is clear that both of the standard 
deviations of the z-scores of failed and non-failed companies are equal. 
Observation 1:5 
These first four observations hold true for all a priori probabilities. While 
the variance - covariance matrices are equal, the estimates of the 
discriminant coefficients, the estimates of the centriods and the 
associated Mahalanobis (J2 are exactly the same for all a priori 
probabilities. This has implications for MDA model developers using 
equal samples of failed and non-failed companies although these 
proportions are not representative of the population of failed and non-
failed companies. 
Unfortunately many of these findings do not hold true when the 
variance - covariance matrices are unequal. This matter is investigated in 
the following section. 
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II: UNEQUAL VARIANCE- COVARIANCE MATRICES: 
Although statistical theory clearly advocates the use of quadratic 
discriminant analysis, [Lachenbruch, 1975] when the variance -
covariance matrices are unequal, many applied researchers frequently 
ignore this advice. Several researchers have investigated the use of both 
linear and quadratic models on the same data and report little difference 
in their ability to classify distressed and non-distressed companies 
correctly, [e.g., Altman & Levalle]. Because of the widespread use of 
linear models with unequal matrices, the affects of changing mean ratios 
under these circumstances was investigated. 
The same scenarios which were examined in the first series of 
experiments were also examined once more, except that the constraint 
of. the equality of the variance - covariance matrices of the failed and 
non-failed companies was relaxed. Although the findings are 
generalisable, the example used to illustrate these findings is one in 
which the numbers involved are quite specific: 
"I:;t = ~ }: nf = 
The sampling proportions were equal with subsequent trials replicating 
those of the first set of experimental simulations. In each case, a single 
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mean ratio of the non-failed companies' group was varied, and the 
results were recorded. 
Observation 11:1 
When the variance - covariance matrices are unequal the discriminant 
coefficients still change linearly in relation to each other, in a similar 
manner to the case of equal matrices, as the mean of a single ratio of 
the non-failed group changes. In this situation, however, there is a 
different linear transformation for each level of a priori probability. 
Figure 3:5 
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Figure 3:6 
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Each of these linear transformation functions intersect at: 
b1 = 0 and where M1 = 3.675 
and for 
b2 = 0 and where M2 = 5.00 
For each population proportion, or a priori probability, there is a different 
discriminant coefficient. The precise mathematical interrelationships 
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were not investigated as, at this stage, it would appear to be of little 
import to applied researchers in the field of corporate distress. The 
implications however are very important for researchers wishing to use 
multivariate linear discriminant models when the variance - covariance 
matrices are unequaL Not only is it important to have first rate estimates 
of the respective mean vectors with low . standard errors, but it is 
important to use a pooling technique which will adjust for the a priori 
probabilities. Even this has to be said with a measure of hesitancy. The 
complexity of changes that take place, even with minor changes in m·ean 
ratios may be significant. In these circumstances it would probably be 
even more useful to the soundness of any particular piece of research if 
strenuous efforts were made to find ratios that had equal variances and 
covariances as welL I am not sure, however, to what extent the pursuit 
of such ideal data is likely to be fruitful. 
Observation 11:2 
The centroid of the failed company group still changes in a linear 
manner as it did when there was an equality of variance - covariance 
matrices, except that there is a different linear function for each level of a 
priori probability. 
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Figure 3:7 
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Convergence of each of these functions occurs at: 
Ct = 0 when Mnf = 3.275 
In the same way as found in the first series of experiments, the centroid 
of the non-failed companies changes quadratically, except that there is a 
different quadratic function for every level of a priori probability. 
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Figure 3:8 
Change in Centroids of Non-failed Cos 
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Convergence of each of these functions occurs at: 
Cnt = -0.10 when Mnt = 2.50 
Observation 11:3 
7 
The distance measure, the Mahalanobis (i, also changes quadratically., 
but the function itself varies with the changes in the probabilities. 
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This phenomenon exists because the Mahalanobis o2 is the distance 
between a linearly changing centroid for failed companies and a 
quadratically changing centroid for non-failed companies, Figure 3:9. 
Figure 3:9 
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Observation 11:4 
Unlike the case of the equal variance - covariance matrices, the standard 
deviation of the failed, the non-failed, and the total sample of all-
companies group z-scores are not equal. This is because each relates to 
their respective variance - covariance matrix. The standard deviation of 
the z-scores for the failed companies is illustrated in figure 3:10. 
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Figure 3:10 
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That is: szf = b' "Et h 
Figure 3:11 shows a similar series of standard deviations for the non-
failed company group. 
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Figure 3:11 
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That is: Sznf = b' E nf b 
Figure 3:12 yet again shows the same kinds of trends for the total 
sample. 
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Figure 3:12 
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This is a critical issue. As the a priori probabilities reduce and in fact 
approach the proportions commonly found in the general population of 
companies, the standard deviation of the z-scores of the non-failed 
companies converges towards that of the total samples. That is this 
occurs as nf approaches So/o and as nnf approaches say 95o/o. 
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Figure 3:13 
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Figure 3:13 shows how the standard deviation of the z-scores for the 
non-failed companies converges much more closely towards that of the 
total sample of all companies combined as a a priori probabilities of non-
failed companies tends towards 1 OOo/o. 
However, although Sznf converges towards Szts this is much less the case 
for the failed group of companies. Figure 3:14 shows how the standard 
deviation of the z-scores for the failed companies converges, or more 
correctly fails to converge, towards that of the total sample for all 
companies combined as a priori probabilities of failed companies tends 
towards a small percentage. 
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Figure 3:14 
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SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS: 
The importance of the research into the effect of introducing changes in 
a single mean ratio for one group of companies in MDA modelling of 
corporate distress is quite complex. In the case of equal variance -
covariance matrices, these changes result in discriminant coefficient and 
group centroid changes. In the former case there is critical zone outside 
which there is a tendency to interpret the coefficients consistently as 
these small changes to the mean ratio are made, and within which not 
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only do the coefficients change but their signs also reverse, thus 
demanding a completely different explanation. Because one centroid 
changes linearly and the other quadratically, there is a zone within 
which small changes in mean ratios are not significant. There is a region 
outside this zone in which small changes result in markedly different 
centroids. In this region it is possible to discriminate well. 
In the case of equal variance - covariance matrices introducing a priori 
probabilities does not affect the statistical parameters because the 
pooled matrix is identical to each of those from failed and non-failed 
companies. 
In the case of unequal variance - covariance matrices a priori 
probabilities do affect the statistical parameters quite dramatically. Not 
only do the changing means provide researchers with similar results as 
discovered in the first set of experiments, but introducing them also 
results in changes in a similar but more complex manner. Introducing a 
priori probabilities results in different estimates of the underlying 
population variance - covariance matrix and thus there is a range of 
discriminant coefficients, a range of centroids and a change in the 
dispersion of the z-scores for each level of probability. 
In conclusion, it would appear that researchers wishing to use the 
multivariate linear discriminant model for discriminating between failed 
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and non-failed companies should approach with caution. It is critical that 
the sample mean vectors should be first-rate estimates of the ratios for 
the particular industry or population. Without first-rate estimates, the 
respective statistical parameters, and particularly in the case of unequal 
variance - covariance matrices, the resulting linear discriminant model 
will not be a satisfactory estimate of the population MDA model. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FORECASTING FAILURE: 
The problems associated with developing MDA models with groups of 
companies' ratio data whose respective variance - covariance matrices 
are unequal should be quite clear enough by now. In short, if the 
matrices are not equal then it is important to use a pooling method that 
reflects the incidence of company failure in the population. This final 
section discusses the implications for forecasting company collapses at 
least one period ahead. 
Even in the case of equal variance - covariance matrices, if an MDA 
model is derived from sample data that perfectly reflects the underlying 
population mean ratio vectors so that the actual sampling error is zero 
for all means ratios, applying the model in a future time period, say t+ 1, 
has . one major problem. The extent of this problem may be so 
devastating as to completely damn virtually any application of our 
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derived model outside the period from which we have drawn our 
sample. 
I can envisage two types of problems. The first is that the same 
relationships between particular ratios and the likelihood of company 
failure might not exist in time period t+ 1. Our lack of a complete theory 
in this respect makes this difficult to assess. 
Secondly, if the time period during time period t+ 1 is one in which the 
mean ratio vectors are significantly different, even though the 
relationship between company failure and its ratios is the same as during 
the sample time period from which we derived the particular model, it 
will fail to forecast company collapses correctly. As we have already 
acknowledged, there is widespread evidence to support the contention 
that -mean ratios are almost invariably different from one time period to 
the next, [Lev,197 4]. 
Such an error in application would be exemplified in the following 
situation, even. when there are only two ratios and equal variance -
covariances. If we begin by deriving a model from sample data from a 
prior period. 
Given that Enf = 
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The number of ratios = 2, and nt = nnt = SO 
rs.ool 
L2.ooj 
f4.00l 
L3.ooJ 
The discriminant coefficients would be b1 = -0.625 and b2 = +0.750 
with centroids ofCt = -0.250 and Cnt = -1.625. 
Now even if the mean vectors of ratios for the period t+ 1 both change 
in the same direction and by the same magnitude, such that the mean 
vector of differences remains the same, and even if the variance -
covariance matrices remain the same as in the derived sample, such 
that the discriminant function coefficients would remain the same, we 
will have a considerable amount of forecast error. 
Given Mt f7.00l 
L3.ooJ 
16.001 
L 4.ooj 
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We would have the same vector of mean differences as in the previous 
period, but the means of the z-scores of the failed and non-failed 
companies would be markedly different. They would now be Cf = -
0.750 and Cnt = -2.125. As the sample means of the ratios for the period 
t+ 1 increase, the mean z-scores of the failed companies tends towards 
the centroid of the non-failed companies thus rendering discrimination 
and therefore ex ante validation impossible. This would mean that we 
would most probably forecast all of the companies as being non-failed. 
We might be tempted to argue that if we know this degree of change 
then we could adjust for the change in mean vectors and effectively 
rescale the ratios. The problem is that we do not have this information in 
advance. We do not know which companies are likely to fail and which 
are not, for that is the purpose of the modelling. Therefore we cannot 
have access to the information about the respective group means. 
Chambers [1973] adds to our understanding of the problem when 
discussing the extensive array of accounting practices that makes 
forecasting difficult. The revaluation of assets, or a change in the method 
of depreciation, to name but two areas of diversity, not just between 
companies, but within them, exacerbates our difficulties. ''The freedom of 
each company to choose its own rules and to vary the rules it uses at its discretion may 
abort any attempt to benefit from financial features of companies," [p.90]. He 
continues to argue that "a little exercise on the combination of these and other 
permissible rules and methods will show that there are over one million sets of rules, each 
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of which could be said by managers and auditors to give a true and fair view of a 
company's state of affairs and its results. The odds against the financial statements of any 
two or more firms being comparable are enormous," [p.91]. Chambers provides a 
wealth of examples. This makes the search for ratios which reflect a 
''proper" view of the health of a company extremely difficult, and, 
furthermore, provides a compounded difficulty when it comes to 
establishing stable mean ratios for failed and non-failed companies from 
which to develop MDA models of corporate distress. Chambers make 
the point that companies can and do choose methods of measurement 
that frequently disguise the underlying facts. 
Finally, the situation just described was very controlled. The mean ratios 
are unlikely to move in tandem and the variance - covariance matrices 
may not remain as they were in the period from which we derived our 
model. Accordingly, when this occurs it is difficult to predict likely 
outcomes, there is a need to look closely at the specific data. Under 
these conditions several coefficients might otherwise be different. 
CONCLUSION: 
There is clearly an interaction between changes in mean ratios, a priori 
probabilities and unequal variance - covariance matrices. Where the 
latter are equal, the dispersion of the z-scores of both groups are equal, 
but where equality of matrices does not exist I would suggest that a 
Page 3:36 
priori probabilities should be reflected in the sampling proportions so 
that the pooled dispersion matrix might best approximate reality. 
It is also clear that the MDA model, when applied to distinguishing 
between failed and non-failed companies is very sensitive to mean ratio 
changes irrespective of the extent of the equality of the variance -
covariance matrices. The possibility of mean ratios changing from one 
period to another is likely to be a major reason for intertemporal 
validation failure. Lev [197 4] shows this to be the case. The extent to 
which mean ratios change in period t+ 1, for example, will be reflected 
in the extent to which the model will fail to forecast correctly, even if 
there is the same relative relationship [i.e., the mean differences remain 
the same] between particular ratios and company success or failure. 
Chapter Four 
THE INTERACTION OF NON-MULTIVARIATE NORMALLY 
DISTRIBUTED DATA AND UNEQUAL VARIANCE- COVARIANCE 
MATRICES. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although research into the effect of unequal variance - covariance 
matrices using multivariate normally distributed data has been carried 
out by Gilbert, [1969], it appears that little work has been published 
about univariately normally distributed data or non-normal data that 
might typically be found in company ratios, [Lachenbruch, 1975]. 
Researchers attempting to build linear discriminant models of 
company failure, are frequently confronted with an additional problem 
to those already discussed in this research.The data may not be 
multivariately normally distributed. In fact, I am unaware of any 
reported research in this field that claims that the data involved is 
distributed in this manner. The procedures for evaluating the extent 
to which the data is multivariately normally distributed are outlined by 
Watson, [1990], but the best that researchers can often do with the 
sample ratio data that is frequently scarce, or at best difficult to 
obtain, is to transform the ratios into unvariately normally distributed 
variables and carry out quite simple checks to see whether or not the 
transformation has been successful. While Mclean and Firth [1987], 
for example, were able to show that although New Zealand company 
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ratios were not even univariately normally distributed, it was possible 
to transform the data into such univariate distributions. Freka and 
Hopwood [1983] have also shown this to be the case with the ratios 
of U.S. manufacturing firms for the period 1950- 1979. Whether this 
procedure is theoretically justifiable is a question which lies outside 
the central concern of this discussion. Of vital practical importance to 
empirical researchers using the MDA technique is the question of the 
extent to which the use of Fisher's linear discriminant analysis is 
invalidated by the use of non-multivariate normally distributed data. 
Several researchers, [e.g. Eisenbeis, Jones], have been critical of 
reported research that does not have multivariately normally 
distributed data. As part of a series of explanations of why models of 
corporate distress fail, and at times why they seem to work despite 
breaching the assumptions, this chapter discusses research into~ 
which univariately normally distributed data, combined with both 
equal and unequal variance - covariance matrices will allow 
satisfactory discrimination to take place. Although it is important to 
identify the circumstances under which this is possible, the findings 
do provide some hope for the practice of using non-multivariately 
normally distributed data together with unequal variance - covariance 
matrices in corporate distress prediction. 
THE OBIECTIVE: 
If data is multivariately normally distributed, then the individual 
variables will be univariately normally distributed. The converse does 
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not hold. Data may be univariately normally distributed, but not 
multivariately so, [Tabachnic & Fidell, 1983]. It is probably too much 
to hope for that ratio data commonly used in corporate distress 
modelling will be unvariately normally distributed, let alone expect it 
to be multivariately normally distributed. Gilbert [1969], Marks and 
Dunn, [1972] and subsequently Lachenbruch, Sneering & Revo, 
[1973] estimated the effect that unequal variance - covariance 
matrices have on the ability of Fisher's discriminant function to 
correctly classify observed phenomena. In these cases, however, they 
usually assumed the multivariate normal distribution. With known 
multivariate distributions it is possible to derive solutions and 
associated probabilities of misclassification. As they are generally not 
reported in MDA research into corporate distress we can only suspect 
that the multivariate distributions of ratio data used in many pieces of 
research throughout the world are many and varied. What is needed 
is an investigation into the extent to which it might be possible to use 
the MDA technique satisfactorily with the kind of data commonly 
used in distress prediction modeling. This research attempts to 
proceed some way down this pathway. The objective of this part of 
the study is to investigate the extent to which simulated ratio data, 
which is univariately but probably not multivariately normally 
distributed, can be correctly classified as the variance - covariance 
matrices of failed and non-failed companies diverge. If we can show 
that this relationship is fairly predictable, we can identify in advance 
the kinds of situations in which models of corporate failure are likely 
to fail to classify adequately. If we know this, we can take steps to 
search for satisfactory solutions. 
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THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 
The method of investigation involved establishing a series of random 
variables which were univariately normally distributed for each of two 
groups. These represented the ratios of failing and non-failing 
companies. The method by which this was achieved is described later 
in this section. As with the work of Gibson, and Marks & Dean, the 
second set of variables representing those of non-failed companies 
were a linear transformation of the first. This enabled both the mean 
vectors and the variance - covariance matrices to be altered under 
controlled conditions. The mean vectors of ratios were gradually 
separat~d, in standardized increments of 0.25, by a simple linear 
transformation, and, at each stage the effect on the ability of the MDA 
technique to classify companies correctly was recorded. As a part of 
this process, the variance - covariance matrices were also separated 
by a ·linear transformation of the variances and covariances in such a 
way that the ratio of the respective sizes took the following values 1 :1, 
2:1, 3:1 and 4:1. Each stage was carried out in a controlled, or step-
wise, manner so that the results could be plotted as other factors 
were held constant. 
The simulated ratios for failed companies were generated by way of a 
BASIC language random number generator RND which produces 
numbers according to a rectangular d,istribution. These numbers were 
then converted to a univariate normal distribution by way of 
Hamming's [1962] method. The specific programming code for this 
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routine is listed in lines 210 - 340 in the simulation programme, 
[Appendix 4:4]. After the generation of the random numbers the data 
was analysed by way of a multiple linear discriminant programme. 
The programme used was a modified version of James' [1985] 
discriminant programme for two groups, [Appendix 4:4]. The 
modification was largely confined to the routines involved with data 
input and output so that the simulation process could run for long 
periods of time without requiring attention. 
The sample size in each simulation was 500 non-failed and 500 failed 
companies. Two, three, four, ten and twenty ratio models were 
evaluated. Except for the twenty variable model each of the other four 
models involved ten separate trials using different sets of randomly 
selected data. The complete set of percentages of correct 
classifications for the four ratio case is reported in appendix 4:1. The 
mean percentages for each of the ten simulation runs for each of the 
two, three, four and ten ratio cases are reported in appendix 4:2. The 
standard deviations of the simulated mean ratios are reported in 
appendix 4:3. Because of the excessive amount of computer time 
required to run the simulation programme, the twenty ratio model 
was only run once. The data are reported in appendix 4:5. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION 
The results are reported in two stages. The first involves a detailed 
analysis of the investigation into ten sets of simulated sample ratio 
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data, each with four variables. The second part of the report provides 
much less detail, but is much more comprehensive in its scope in 
order to provide a sounder basis for generalising. It discusses the 
results of the simulations of the two, three, ten and twenty ratio 
studies. 
Firstly, the four ratio model was chosen quite arbitrarily for a start. The 
variabl~s, X1 to X4, were chosen and the normally distributed data set 
with 500 cases in each group was obtained as described earlier. The 
data was then standardised so as to have means of zero and initially a 
standard deviation of one. This allowed for simpler linear 
transformations without influencing the outcomes of the experiments. 
The variance-covariance matrices of failed and non-failed companies 
were equal. A typical one is reported in table 4:1. 
Table 4:1 - Ef = Enf- Four ratio case. 
x1 Xz x3 N 
x1 1.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.12 
Xz 0.04 1.00 -0.07 -0.06 
x3 -0.04 -0.07 1.00 0.07 
N -0.12 -0.06 0.07 1.00 
As the data was standardised, the variance - covariance matrix was 
also the correlation matrix. 
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A priori probabilities throughout the experiment were set at the 0.5 
level. It should be of no great surprise to find that the function 
classified correctly only SOo/o of the time when the mean ratios of both 
failed and non-failed companies were identical. 
The experimental process involved successively increasing ·the 
standardised means of the ratio data for the non-failed companies in 
increments of 0.25. This was carried out in order to record the 
percentage of correct classifications as the distance between the two 
vectors of mean ratios increased. The original results are reported in 
appendix 4:1. Table 4:2 summarises the mean percentages of correct 
classifications obtained from the 10 simulation runs. Appendix 4:3 
reports the standard deviations about the overall means reported in 
table 4:2. As the dispersion of simulated results is very low indeed 
with a maximum of 1.81% for all simulations, the overall means of the 
10 simulations can be regarded as being highly representative of the 
recorded data. 
Table 4:2- Lf = Lnf ·Four ratio case. 
Standardised Mean Vector Differences. 
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 3.00 
Percentage of Correct Classifications. 
SO% 62o/o 72o/o 81 o/o 88o/o 92o/o 94% 97o/o 99o/o 1 OOo/o 
Clearly, this is the kind of situation for which Fisher designed MDA. 
Where the variance - covariance matrices are equal, the ability of the 
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technique to discriminate between the two groups is enhanced as the 
difference between the mean vectors increases, despite the lack of 
conformity to the multivariate normality assumption. Ignoring the 
question of a priori probabilities and the question of the costs of 
misclassification, we clearly have fairly good discrimination where the 
mean vectors are separated by one standardised unit, i.e., an 88o/o 
correct classification. It seems that the assumption of multivariate 
normality appears only to be critical where the mean vectors are 
markedly similar. Clearly as the differences between the means of the 
ratios of the two groups increases, discriminatory power increases 
dramatically. Any failure of MDA models to discriminate is a function, 
not of the technique itself, but of the characteristics of the data. If the 
mean ratio data is significantly different for each group, and if that data 
is stable over time, and, as already discussed in chapter three, this is 
likely to be a problem, then there does not seem to be any reason for 
MDA models not to classify correctly. It may be the failure of the 
many researchers in the field of corporate distress to understand this 
point that has caused them to discard MDA models unnecessarily. I 
strongly contend that the search for a better technique is misguidedly 
based upon the wrong assumption, that is, the assumption that there 
might be something less than satisfactory about the MDA technique. 
If there are minor differences between the ratios of the two groups, 
and the respective sample variances are relatively large, then our 
ability to discriminate is limited, if at all possible. If not, the Fisher 
model will discriminate. 
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As we relax the equality constraint with respect to the variance -
covariance matrices to the point where the variance - covariance 
matrix of the second group is twice the size of the first, the normal 
pooling procedure is to used to estimate the population variance -
covariance matrix. Like other computing programmes, James' 
programme also utilizes this approach. The resulting matrix is shown 
in table 4:3. 
Table 4:3- Ef = 0.50 :Enf- Four ratio case. 
x1 x2 x3 x4 
. x1 1.5 0.06 -0.06 -0.18 
x2 0.06 1.5 -0.11 -0.09 
x3 -0.06 -0.11 1.5 0.11 
x4 -0.18 -0.09 0.11 1.5 
As we know under these conditions we should use the quadratic 
model, [Lachenbruch, James], yet from a careful observation of table 
4:4 we can see that the MDA model classifies very well after the 
standardised mean difference becomes 1.25. Even at a standardised 
mean difference of 1.0 we have only lost 4o/o on our previous 
classification rate. 
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Table 4:4 - Lf = 0.50 Lnf- Four ratio case. 
Standardised Mean Vector Differences. 
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 3.00 
Percentage of Correct Classifications. 
SOo/o 61% 70o/o 78o/o 84o/o 90o/o 91o/o 93o/o 95o/o 100o/o 
The resulting variance- covariance matrix of the second group is three 
times the size of the first group we have the following results: 
Table 4:5- Lf = 0.33 Lnf- Four ratio case. 
x1 x2 x3 x4 
x1 2.0 0.09 -0.09 -0.24 
x2 0.09 2.0 -0.14 -0.11 
x3 -0.09 -0.14 2.0 0.15 
x4 -0.24 -0.11 0.15 2.0 
The percentage of correct classifications is shown in table 4:6 
Table 4:6- Lf = 0.33 Lnf·- Four ratio case 
Standardised Mean Vector Differences. 
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 3.00 
Percentage of Correct Classifications. 
SOo/o 61o/o 68o/o 76o/o 81o/o 88o/o 90o/o 92o/o 93o/o 98o/o 
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Again at the mean difference level of 1.25, for example, it is still 
possible to achieve the same level of correct classification as achieved 
with the first model at a mean difference of 1.0. Finally we can 
examine the case where the variance - covariance matrix of the 
second group is four time the size of the first table 4:7. 
Table 4:7- Er = 0.25 Enf- Four ratio case. 
x1 x2 x3 x4 
x1 2.5 0.11 -0.11 -0.30 
x2 0.11 2.5 -0.18 -0.14 
x3 -0.11 -0.18 2.5 0.19 
x4 -0.30 -0.14 0.19 2.5 
The percentages of correct classification is show in table 4:8. 
Table 4:8- Lr = 0.25 Enr- Four ratio case. 
Standardised Mean Vector Differences. 
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 3.00 
· Percentage of Correct Classifications. 
SO% 59% 67% 75% 82% 86% 89% 91 o/o 92% 96o/o 
The four ratio case shows the extent to which classification accuracy 
is possible as the variance - covariance matrices diverge from each 
other. Appendix 4:2 reports the same kind of results from the 
simulations involving two, three, ten and 20 ratios. A graphical 
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summary of the finding should allow an understanding of the 
interaction between the variables in the process. 
A GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION: 
If the results are collated into a graphical summary [figure 4:1] of the 
effects of differences between the vectors of mean ratios in relation to 
the unequal variance- covariance matrices, we can observe the trend 
for the first sample set of four variables. 
Figure 4:1 
Cumulative % of Correct Classifications 
The Four Ratio Case. 
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The graph line on the left represents the mean percentage 
classification for the equal variance - covariance case, where .Et = .Ent1 
while the curve on the right the case where the variance - covariance 
of non-failed companies is four times that of failed companies, i.e., 
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where Et = 0.25 Enf,. The two intermediate graph lines represent 
the intermediate relationships accordingly. 
It appears that despite the supposed need for a quadratic discriminant 
approach, researchers are able to obtain satisfactory results from the 
MDA technique despite the fact that the variance - covariance 
matrices are clearly unequal. The exten.t to which this is possible is a 
function of the differences between the mean vectors as well as the 
magnitude of the difference between the variance - covariance 
matrices. As with the question of the relevance of a priori 
probabilities, the critical factor influencing the situation is that of the 
differences between the means of the ratios for the failing and non-
failing companies respectively. If we have relatively large differences 
then a priori probabilities~are far less important and similarly if we 
have relatively large differences between the ratio means, we have 
clear discrimination arising from a linear discriminant model, despite 
the inequality of the variance - covariance matrices, and despite the 
fact that the data is only univariately normally distributed. Although 
the evidence seems to justify this conclusion in the case of a four 
variate model a more generalised base is required to show that the 
results are not unique to this situation. 
A MORE GENERALISED APPROACH: 
In order to confirm the conclusions already drawn four sets of similar 
simulations were carried out. Two, three, ten and twenty ratio models 
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were evaluated. The trends were of a remarkably similar kind to those 
produced by the four ratio model. Figure 4:2 reports the findings of 
the two ratio model. 
Figure 4:2 
Cumulative % of Correct Classifications 
The Two Rallo Case. 
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In each case the upper curve reflects the cumulative percentage of 
correct classifications where the variance - covariance matrices are 
equal. The next curve down reflects the percentage of correct 
classifications where I:t = 0.5 I:nt· The remaining two curves are the 
results of the simulations under conditions in which Et = 0.33 Ent 
and Et = 0.25 Enf respectively. The two ratio model provides similar 
results to the four ratio model. Next three ratios were evaluated 
under the same conditions. 
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Figure 4:3 reports the findings of the three ratio simulations. 
Figure 4:3 
Cumulative % of Correct Classifications 
The Three Varloble Case 
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Again a similar pattern of relationships between the mean ratio vector 
differences and the respective variance - covariance matrices was 
obtained. As a result of the similarity of results with models involving 
two, three and four ratios it was decided to investigate a ten ratio 
model under the same conditions. 
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Figure 4:4 reports the findings of the 10 ratio simulations. 
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Apart from the tendency of the curves to move upwards and to the 
left as the number of ratios was increased the results obtained from 
the simulations were very much the same. A final run with 20 ratios 
was made in order to draw final conclusions. 
Because of the 20 ratio simulations required a large amount of 
computer time only a single simulation was undertaken. This was no 
doubt because of the slowness of the BASIC language programme. 
The slowness of the language did not of course affect the findings. 
The results which trend in the same manner are reported in figure 
4:5. 
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Figure 4:5 
Cumulative % of Correct Classifications 
The 20 Ratio Case. 
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Mean Ratio - Vector Differences 
Each of the models produces the same pattern of results. There is an 
initial inability to classify above the probability levels of chance, 
around the range of mean differences between 0.0 and 0.80, until the 
mean vectors are separated sufficiently. After this high percentages of 
correct classification are rapidly achieved. In each case the ability of 
the MDA model to classify correctly is enhanced with smaller 
differences between the variance - covariance matrices of failed and 
non-failed companies. This is reflected in the fact that in each case the 
differences in the ability to classify correctly become smaller as the 
mean vectors separate. This is what we would expect in the case of 
multivariately normally distributed data. It is reassuring to find that 
this is also the case with ratio data that is only univariately distributed. 
The fact that we do not know the distribution behind the data 
however means that with small samples we are unlikely to have any 
idea of the distribution of the z-scores and hence are unable to be 
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able to speak meaningfully about probabilities of group membership if 
there is anything like a zone of ignorance. 
In this section of this report the results of varying both the variance -
covariance matrices, the mean differences and the number of ratios 
have been reported while holding the number of ratios constant in 
each graph. The following section reports the results while holding 
the variance - covariance matrices constant in order to obtain a clear 
view of the affects of varying the number of ratios in the modelling 
process. 
COMPARING THE SITUATIONS DIFFERENTLY: 
If we now take the same information and compare the extent to 
which the number of ratios in the models are able to provide 
adequate discrimination while the variance - covariance matrices are 
separated we gain yet further insights. 
The simulations in which both matrices were equal are summarised 
by the graph in figure 4:6 
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Figure 4:6 Ef = Enf 
Cumulative % Correct Classifications 
Covf = Covnf 
100 
.. 
90 
c 
.2 
8 
1;: 
80 ·~ 
D (3 
1> 
~ 70 
8 
0 
" 60 
"' ~ 
II> 
1: 
0... 50 
40 
0 0.4 0.8 ·1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 
Mean Ratio Dlfference$ 
Where: 
x = the 20 ratio model 
1::. = the 10 ratio model 
o = the 4 ratio model 
+ = the 3 ratio model 
o = the 2 ratio model 
Although the data is only univariately normally distributed all of the 
models rapidly classify the simulated ratio data correctly. 
The simulations in which the variance - covariance matrix of failed 
companies is twice the size of that of the non-failed companies is 
portrayed in figure 4:7. 
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Figure 4:7 Lr = 0.50 Lnf 
Cumulative % Correct Classifications 
2Covf = Covnf. 
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Clearly, in the case where the variance - covariance matrix of the non-
failed companies is twice the size of that of the failed companies, the 
ability of the MDA model to discriminate between the two groups is 
not only possible but it improves progressively with an increase in the 
number of ratios. 
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Figure 4:8 kf = 0.33 knf 
Cumulative % Correct Classifications 
3Covf = Covnf 
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The same pattern is reflected in the data where the variance -
covariance matrix of the non-failed companies is three times as large 
as the other. Finally, what might be termed the extreme case, where 
the variance- covariance matrix is four times as large as that of failed 
companies, the same pattern is revealed, [figure 4:9]. 
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Figure 4:9 :Ef = 0.25 :Enf · 
Cumulative % Correct Classifications 
4Covf = Covnf 
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These three graphs lead us to similar conclusions. There are a few 
important points to recognise in these findings. 
Firstly, the ability of the MDA model to classify correctly deteriorates 
progressively as the variance - covariance matrices diverge. The graph 
in figure 4:9 has a similar pattern to that of figure 4:6 but the curve 
has shifted to the right. 
Secondly, in each of the three graphs, the graph lines are rather 
jumbled where the mean differences are relatively small. This reflects 
the fact that, as the variance - covariance matrices diverge from each 
other, larger mean ratio vector differences between failed and non-
failed companies are required before linear discriminant models begin 
to classify correctly. 
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Thirdly, once the differences between mean ratios vectors are clearly 
different the models all classify well, irrespective of the fact that the 
variance - covariance matrices are not equal, and irrespective of the 
fact that the data is only univariately normally distributed. It seems 
that linear discriminant models classify well in the extremes. Critical 
comments by various authors [e.g. Eisenbeis] regarding the apparent 
misuse of MDA techniques when the assumptions of multivariate 
normality and the equality of the variance- covariance matrices may 
be valid where the mean differences are not relatively large. In these 
kinds of circumstances the MDA models will fail to classify 
satisfactorily, but where the mean ratio vectors are well separated 
MDA models appear to classify well despite the breach of the formal 
assumptions. 
Fourthly, the more ratios in the model, the more successful the MDA 
model is at correctly classifying the data even when the variance -
covariance matrices are markedly different. From a certain critical level 
of mean difference between the ratio vectors the curves rise steeply 
as the models rapidly increase their ability to discriminate. This critical 
level which changes according to the extent of the inequality of the 
variance - covariance matrices can be observed on each of the graphs. 
In all cases the larger the number of ratios the more steeply the 
percentage correct classification curve rises from this critical point. 
This does not provide a basis for arguing that step-wise procedures 
should not be used in order to reduce the data in any way, 
particularly as the simulated data was only very weakly 
intercorrelated. Step-wise procedures only reduce the dimensions of 
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discriminant models where multicollinearity is present. Judging from 
the culling out of ratios from various published models there would 
seem to be a fairly high degree of multicollinearity in the variables 
used. This is logical because the ratios are drawn from balance sheets 
and income statements and frequently have the same denominators. 
As multicollinearity increases amongst the variables the less 
successful we will be in correctly classifying as additional variables are 
included. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY: 
Although I am confident of the conclusions of this part of the study, 
the study itself has a number of limitations, some of which point to 
the need for further research, others of which may not be too 
important. 
Firstly, it was been assumed that the univariately normally distributed 
data was not also multivariately distributed. The simulations had been 
completed when it occurred to me that it would have been a little 
more reassuring to have tested for multivariate normality. As obtaining 
such a multivariate normal distribution, even one, by chance 
however, in so many simulated trials [41 trials in total] would be 
extremely unlikely, I think that the results are still valid. 
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Secondly, like Gilbert's research methodology, the two sets of 
simulated data were related in that the ratios of the non-failed 
companies were a linear function of the ratios of the failed companies 
data. This was done in order that the variance - covariance matrices 
could be exactly equal to each other for the first set of trials. Although 
I cannot perceive anyway in which this might invalidate the results, 
nor Gilbert's, it is at least possible that this may be the case. 
Thirdly, although this part of the research has focused on the 
univariate normal distribution, other distributions of ratio data need to 
be simulated. By analogy the results should be the same or similar. 
Fourthly, although a priori probabilities were not used to develop the 
model, this would affect the cut-off points in the various models, but 
perhaps more critically, as was found in chapter three, as the variance 
- covariance matrices diverged the discriminant function itself would 
change. This aspect needs further research. 
Fifthly, in this study all of the mean ratios of the non-failed companies 
were increased simultaneously. This was done in order to identify the 
trend in the ability to classify correctly. This is important but in reality I 
strongly suspect that this is unlikely to happen for there will probably 
tend to be a confusing set of movements. 
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Although we cannot be totally sure, the limitations of the research do 
not appear to be too damning. It appears that valid conclusions may 
be tentatively drawn. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
It is clear from these experiments that despite the non-multivariate 
normality of the distribution of the simulated ratio data the critical 
factor in whether or not discriminant models of corporate failure are 
likely to be able to discriminate satisfactorily is the differences 
between the mean vectors of ratios. If we wish to produce useful 
linear discriminant models of corporate failure we should focus on 
identifying ratios which are significantly different. Before plunging into 
discriminant analysis we need to test the significance of the difference 
between the mean vectors of ratios for the failing and non-failing 
groups of companies. Ratios whose means are not significantly 
different will not discriminate well. Sets of ratios whose means are 
significantly different will discriminate well, even if the data is only 
univariately and not multivariately distributed, and even if the variance 
- covariance matrices are not equal. It appears that the greater the 
inequalities in the mean vectors of ratios, although there is still room 
for more research in this field, irrespective of the underlying 
distribution of the ratios, the less important the question of the 
equality of the variance - covariance matrices becomes. Finding ratios, 
however, that are markedly different for failed and non-failed 
companies is not necessarily an easy task. 
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The criticism that MDA models of corporate distress are generally in 
breach of the assumptions underlying the technique is valid enough. 
It is difficult to find fault with this. However, from this research, it 
appears to be a much less critical issue than has been argued in the 
literature. 
Chapter Five 
SAMPLING FAILURES 
INTRODUCTION: 
In general, poor sampling methods have been employed in past 
research into discriminant models of corporate distress. They are poor in 
several important respects and each contributes to the ultimate failure of 
the MDA models. The most critical is the failure to use random samples. 
Except where population data is used, unless sample companies are 
selected by random methods, then ex post, let alone ex ante evaluation, 
is highly likely to be a waste of time. The selected samples are most 
unlikely to be representative of the .population because of biases in 
selection. Other sampling issues have also been widely discussed and 
will be summarized in the brief literature review. This chapter introduces 
two more design failures in the sampling methods employed. They 
appear to be important. Firstly, I will argue, that although seemingly 
scientific, the common practice of dividing a sample into a hold-out 
sample and a sample from which the MDA model is derived, the 
method is at best only pseudo-scientific and at worst completely 
unscientific. It is pseudo-scientific in that hypotheses are not first 
established and then tested by replication. It is also pseudo-scientific in 
that the hold-out method involves such a vast number of possible 
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combinations that models that seemingly replicate in this fashion are 
really only encountered by chance. This matter is discussed at length. 
Secondly, the common practice of using a hold-out sample is inefficient 
because the standard errors of the ratio means in any sample of 
companies involved is increased unnecessarily in the process. The sort 
of data needed for this kind of research is scarce enough without our 
compounding the problem by using it inefficiently. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
The sampling methods have been extensively criticized by several 
writers. Joy and Tollefson [1975] made the point that proper random 
sampling should be used where we expect the . results to be 
representative of any population larger than the sample. "The sampling 
frame should be conceptually identical to the populations towards which the research 
question is directed'•, [p:725]. They point out, for example, that if it is 
intended to discriminate between good and bad loan applicants the 
"samples should be from populations of good and bad loan applicants, not from 
populations of good and bad loan acceptances where applicants that were denied credit 
are excluded/ [p:725]. The more we deviate from random sampling, the 
more bias is allowed to develop and the more the derived model is likely 
to be sample specific. Although much of the research carried out in this 
field has been with non-randomly selected samples, this aspect has 
been adequately examined in the literature, [Zimjewski 1984]. Although 
sometimes population data is used, the discussion in this chapter 
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assumes that proper random samples have been selected with a view to 
deriving an MDA model of a larger population of which the particular 
sample is representative. 
Zimjewski [1984] "examines conceptually and empirically two estimation biases 
which can result when financial distress models are estimated on nonrandom samples. 
The first bias results from "oversampling" distressed firms ...... The second results from using. 
a "complete data" sample selection criterion", [p:59]. His argument about the 
oversampling bias is discussed because of the almost overwhelming 
tendency for researchers to use the population of failed companies in 
contrast to a sample of non-failed firms is interesting. Although he was 
able to show that considerable biases existed in the probit and logit 
models, he found that only the constant was biased in the case of MDA 
models. 
Zimjewski also points out that although the employment of the "complete 
data" criterion in sample selection might seem to possess certain niceties, 
this leads to biases in the selection process. Companies for which only 
incomplete data is available are excluded from the analysis. In reviewing 
Zimjewski's paper, Dietrich [1984] reinforces the notion with a 
complementary thought. "Bankrupt firms have significantly longer delays in releasing 
financial reports than nonbankrupt firms," [Dietrich 1984; p:86]. This 
exacerbates the sampling errors involved. 
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jones [1987] also discusses sample selection in data collection. 11An 
unfortunate outcome of the focus on bankruptcy is that sample sizes may be quite small111 
[p:133]. For example, Altman [1968], Deakin [1972], Elam [1975], 
Altman. et.al., [1977], Van Frederikslust [1978], Norton and Smith [1979], 
Dambolena and Khoury [1980], Emery and Cogger [1982], and Hamer 
[1983], rely on small samples of bankrupt firms numbering only 33, 32, 
48, 53, 20, 30, 46, 52, and 44 respectively. He points out that there is a 
sampling bias in that large bankrupt firms are always included, while 
small firms are not even included in the US Compustat database. 11The 
importance of this bias is undeniable since small firms are especially prone to 
bankruptcy/' [p:133]. He also points out that new firms are usually 
excluded from the sample because researchers typically want five or 
more years of data 11in order to test the capability of the model to forecast failure five 
or less years away/ [p:133]. The fact that new firms are usually excluded 
when they are especially prone to financial collapse, introduces yet 
another source of bias into the sampling processes employed. 
Finally, jones argues that although the use of matched pairs seems to be 
. \ 
sound in some respects, this also presents problems. 11An unfortunate 
drawback of this approach is that the controlled variables [used in the matching process] 
may be valuable predictors1 11 [p:134]. The matching approach may be 
excluding important distinguishing qualities. 
The list of sampling errors and biases introduced into MDA research into 
corporate distress is quite substantial. This chapter discusses two further 
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sampling issues so far not discussed in the literature. The first is the 
inadequacies of replicating with a hold-out sample. It is at best pseudo-
scientific. The second is the inefficiency of using an hold-out sample in 
the process. It increases the standard errors involved unnecessarily. 
THE INADEQUACIES OF REPLICATING WITH A HOLD-OUT SAMPLE: 
The objective of scientific enquiry is to establish the facts about 
relationships in the real world. An important part of the establishing of 
this truth is to be able to demonstrate these relationships repeatedly; 
i.e., by replicating research findings. This process usually involves a 
serious attempt at specifying an hypothesis, which seems to provide 
some explanation for observable relationships in the real world. Having 
established an hypothesis by evidence, the model is then usually re-
evaluated using a fresh sample of data. The hypothesis is then accepted, 
rejected or modified for further research. This process is rarely followed 
in the development of particular models of corporate distress. 
The most comt:nonly used method by which MDA models of corporate 
distress have been developed throughout the world is one in which a 
sample of failed and non-failed companies have been selected. In order 
to derive a model it is common practice to divide the sample into two 
smaller sub-samples, the latter being the hold-out sample and the 
former being the data from which the model is derived. The ratios, 
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recorded against each company, are frequently analysed by way of a 
step-wise linear discriminant programme applied to the first sub-sample. 
This step-wise procedure normally culls out superfluous variables and 
reduces the multicollinearity problem amongst the ratios. The derived 
models are then tested against the hold-out sample data. If the derived 
model classifies the hold-out sample companies with a sufficiently high 
degree of accuracy the model is usually deemed to be satisfactory. It is 
deemed to have been replicated. If not, the procedure is recommenced 
until a model which fits both sub-samples is found. 
Despite its seeming consistency with scientific practice, the basis for this 
practice is unsound. The process is pseudo-scientific. It is pseudo-
scientific in that researchers usually systematically work through a series 
of derived stepwise MDA models testing each against the hold-out 
sample. Models which do not fit both sub-samples are rejected. Models 
which do fit are obviously retained and frequently published as being 
successful. 
Replication in this manner denies the underlying motivation of testing in 
the so-called real world, i.e., to measure the extent to which hypotheses 
and research findings are able to be objectively tested evaluated. The 
pseudo-scientific approach of massaging the sub-samples of the data 
until researchers in the field of corporate dis~ress classification actually 
obtains a function which fits both sets of data almost has an air of 
inevitability about it. Given enough variables and given the sample sizes 
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commonly used in this type of research, if one tries hard or long enough 
we are almost bound to obtain something that works across both sub-
samples, even by chance. Altman, himself, acknowledges this possibility 
when he talks of the possibility of "bias due to intensive searching", [1968; 
p.600]. 
The extent to which individual ratios vary has a significant influence on 
the number of possible models that can be obtained from any sample of 
companies. As the variances of ratios increase there is a tendency for 
sub-samples to be relatively different from each other. In selecting from 
sample with high sample variances, it is much more likely that any sub-
sample drawn will be significantly different from other possible samples, 
and thus markedly increase the likelihood of obtaining a sub-sample 
specific model. If this is the case, then we have to ask which model is 
the correct one. The number of possible solutions or models that can be 
developed from even small samples with this type of research method is 
vast. 
If, for example, a random sample of 50 failed and 50 non-failed 
companies, each of which was measured by the same 20 ratios, was to 
be analysed by the sub-sample from which the MDA model is derived 
and the hold-out validation method, the distribution of the number of 
possible sub-samples of failed and non-failed companies, together with 
the number of possible combinations of ratios is reflected in table 5:1. 
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Table 5:1 The Number of Possible Samples from 50 companies 
Number in the Sub-sample Number of Sub-samples 
1 50 
2 2450 
3 58800 
4 921200 
5 1.06 * 107 
6 9.53 * 107 
7 6.99 * 108 
8 4.30 * 109 
9 2.25 * 1010 
10 1.03 * 1011 
11 4.11 * 1011 
12 1.47 * 1012 
13 4.61 * 1012 
14 1.31 * 1013 
15 3.38 * 1013 
16 7.88 * 1013 
17 1.67 * 1014 
18 3.25 * 1014 
19 5.78*1014 
20 9.43 * 1014 
21 1.41 * 1015 
22 1.95 * 1015 
23 2.48 * 1015 
24 2.92 * 1015 
25 3.16 * 1015 
The number of combinations of 30 companies for example = 50 - 30 
= 20 as the distribution is symmetrical. · 
Now examine the number of possible combinations of 20 ratios in table 
5:2. 
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Table 5:2 The Number of Combinations of 20 Ratios. 
Number of Ratios Number of Possible Combinations 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
20 
190 
1140 
4845 
15504 
38760 
77520 
125970 
167960 
184756 
167960 
125970 
77520 
38760 
15504 
4845 
1140 
190 
20 
1 
So now if we take the products of these combinations in the following 
manner we will derive the number of possible combinations of sub-
samples of failed, non-failed and combinations of ratios that are possible 
from an original set of 50 failed and 50 non-failed companies measured 
by way of 20 ratios. For example if we select 22 failed, 30 non-failed 
companies and 15 ratios we will have: 1.9515 * 1.4115 * 15504 = 4.26 * 
1034 possible sub-samples from which to derive the MDA model of 
corporate distress. This would then be tested against the hold-out 
sample. Which sub-sample is the one likely to be most representative of 
the original? 
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The effective number of possible combinations of sub-samples will 
decline under two conditions. Firstly as the variance of each of the ratios 
declines there will be little apparent difference in selecting one particular 
sample or another. This, however, appears to be unlikely in practice. The 
larger the variances in the ratios, the more likely the sub-samples 
selected will produce MDA models that are sample specific. Conversely, 
where the variance of the ratios is relatively high, the significance of 
selecting one sub-sample rather than another may have a marked 
influence on the derived discriminant model. 
Secondly, if step-wise discriminant procedures are used this will reduce 
the number of possible models to the number of ratios because the 
technique will optimise within any set of n ratios. The overall number of 
combinations will still remain very large. 
As a methodology, the use of an hold-out sample to validate a derived 
MDA model is inadequate for two reasons. Firstly, it is at best a pseudo-
scientific process because iterative procedures are almost always 
employed until a model that fits both sub-samples is obtained. This does 
not accord with the commonly held view of scientific replication. 
Secondly, this process, if carried out across all possible sub-samples 
would be extremely inefficient, to say the least. If, with the above 
example of 50 failed, 50 non-failed companies and 20 ratios, it took the 
computer one minute to calculate, then a computer would take 4.9 * 
1027 years; an impossible amount of time which indicates the futility of 
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using the method. Unless all possible sub-samples are investigated how 
can we be sure that the most appropriate MDA model has been 
identified. Furthermore, even if we do calculate all possible 
combinations, then by what criterion or criteria would we decide to 
choose one model rather than another? The sub-sampling of an original 
sample is inefficient in another respect also. 
THE INEFFICIENCY OF HOLD-OUT SAMPLES: 
The method is also inefficient in that in reducing the sample size in order 
to derive the model we unnecessarily increase the standard errors 
involved. Samples selected on a proper random sample basis, on 
average, will have the smallest amount of sampling error for that sample 
size. To reduce the sample size further in order to estimate an MDA 
model introduces a second dimension of errors. Even if the sub-sample 
is representative of the total sample, its use merely increases the 
magnitude of the errors markedly. 
As discussed in chapter four, the importance of establishing unbiased 
estimates of the population mean ratios in discriminant research is 
paramount. The failure to do so will simply result in models which will 
not replicate in an ex post environment, let alone validate in a ex ante 
sense. The hold-out sample method of deriving an MDA model is highly 
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inefficient in the sense that it leads to very much poorer estimates of the 
population means. 
The standard error of the mean, that is the extent to which it will vary 
due to sampling error, is a function of both the sample size and the 
standard deviation in the ratio of the population as a whole. Now if for 
the time-being we assume that the population is infinite, we can 
estimate the increased error that is likely to occur as a result of using the 
hold-out sample method. 
Now given that the standard error of the mean for random samples 
selected from infinite populations is given by the formula Se [The 
standard error of the mean] = S/n11h where n1 is the sample size of 
either failed or non-failed companies. 
If, for example, a random sample of the following dimensions is chosen: 
n = 100 companies [50 failed and 50 non-failed) and S [the sample 
standard deviation of a ratio) = 3.00 we can examine the calculations 
precisely. 
Now if the full sample of companies were used. in deriving the MDA 
model the standard error of the mean would be 3/50ifz, that is, 0.42. 
This means that the true population mean would lie somewhere 
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between the sample mean plus or minus 0.83 at the 95o/o confidence 
level. 
Now if in order to develop a MDA model, we halve the sample to 
provide for a hold-out sample, the resulting standard error of the mean 
would equal 3/50'h or 0.6. This means that our best estimate of the 
population mean at the 95% level would lie somewhere between the 
sample mean plus or minus 1.176 at the 95o/o confidence level. As we 
subdivide our already small samples into two, we increase the size of 
the standard errors associated with the means. In this case we increased 
the sampling error by 41 o/o. This is of particular importance because 
unbiased estimates of the population means are of critical importance to 
the developing of valid and replicable MDA models of corporate distress. 
Now we must generalise this case for random samples from infinite 
populations. Given that the percentage increase in the standard error 
increases with the reduction in the sub-sample size it is defined as: 
[[Standard error of sub-sample - standard error of sample]/[Standard 
error of the sample] - 1.] *1 00 
This becomes 
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where "a" = the reciprocal of the percentage of the sample used in 
deriving the particular model. 
This becomes: 
{ [ -----~~~~~-~~~~------------ ] -1 } * 1 00 
S/nlh . 
= {[n/n/a] 1A -1}*100 
= [alf,_ 1]*100 
The percentage increase in the standard error of the mean is a constant 
for any particular sub-sampling proportion. As the proportion of the total 
sample used to compute the discriminant model reduces, so the 
standard error of the mean increases. It is not a function of the standard 
deviation, nor is it a function of the sample size itself. It appears to be a 
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function of this factor alone. Figure 5:1 reflects this situation quite 
clearly. 
Figure 5:1 
Inefficiency of HoiCI-out Sample Methods 
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Clearly as we decrease the sub-sample size for the purpose of deriving a 
MDA model to be tested on a hold-out sample we introduce an 
unnecessary source of error in the process. If, for example, we use 25% 
of the total sample of non-failed companies to derive the model, we will 
increase the standard errors by 1 OOo/o. If instead we halve the sample, 
we will increase the standard errors by 41o/o. As shown in chapter four 
MDA models are driven primarily off means and mean differences and 
are extremely sensitive to even small changes in the mean ratios, then it 
is difficult, if not impossible to justify the further increasing of sampling 
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errors in our estimates of the mean ratios by using the hold-out sample 
method. In fact, I will assert that there can be no justification for this 
pseudo-scientific and inefficient procedure at all. However, before 
closing the chapter on the topic it would seem to be necessary to 
introduce another two sources of realism to the situation. 
NOW LOOKING AT THE REAL WORLD: 
In fact,· much of the MDA research into corporate distress has been 
plagued by an alarming shortage of failed companies. It seems more 
than a little strange that in order that we might predict corporate 
collapses more effectively, we need a lot more to collapse so that the 
quality of the predictions might be improved. Be that as it may, 
researchers have had to make do with the data that they can obtain. In 
the case of collapsing companies it has more often than not been 
necessary to use population data, that is, the complete set of failed 
companies. The ramifications of this has to be explored. Secondly, 
where either populations of failed or non-failed companies have been 
sampled instead, then the standard errors of the estimates of the means 
of the . ratios involved need to be modified by the finite population 
correction factor. Firstly let us examine the situation in which 
researchers either have or are tempted to use a sub-sample of the 
population of failed companies from which to derive a MDA model 
before testing upon an hold-out sample. 
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In population data non-sampling error may exist, for example, 
measurement error, but there will be no error due to sampling at all. 
This is the case, by definition, for we have selected the population. If we 
then sub-divide the population of failed companies into two samples we 
inevitably introduce sampling error. There is no point in doing this at all. 
There can be no justification for making the estimates of the mean ratios 
less accurate than completely accurate for the pseudo-scientific notion 
of replication. Replication is not necessary when we can say something 
about the population itself. It is banal to attempt to do so. 
Although the concept of the finite population factor [FPCF] is a fairly 
straight forward idea well discussed in most first year university level 
statistics courses, introducing the finite population correction factor 
where the population size of non-failed companies is usually small, is 
moderately_ complex, but nevertheless important. The FPCF is given by 
[(N- n)/(N- 1)]lf•, [Newbold p:240], where N is the population size. 
The percentage loss in efficiency, or percentage increase in the standard 
error of the mean ratio then becomes: 
which, for a sample divided in half, reduces to [See Appendix 5:1] 
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{[a(N-n/a)/(N- n)rh- 1} *100 
The percentage error introduced by subsampling a finite population is a 
function of the proportion of the of failed companies that is used to 
derive the MDA model, the population size and the sample size. With 
larger populations, although not infinite, the additional source of error 
introduced by the finite population is not significant. Frequently we are 
not dealing with large populations however. Figure 5:2 shows the extent 
to which the magnitude of the increased error in finite populations 
converges with the amount of error where the population can be 
regarded as being infinite: 
Figure 5:2 
Percentage error in finite populations 
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There seem to be several points at issue here. Where the original 
sample of failed or non-failed companies is halved, for example, the 
increase in the standard error of the mean ratio will be 41%, i.e., [2lh - 1] 
*100 for infinite populations. Figure 5.2 introduces two other variables. 
Firstly, as the population size increases, the standard error of the mean 
reduces and converges towards the level of increased error for infinite 
populations, i.e., 41% shown on the bottom line. Secondly, although the 
standard error of the mean increases with smaller samples, the amount 
of increased error that occurs as a result of halving the sample tends to 
reduce with smaller samples. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY: 
This analysis may be weaker than necessary as a result of treating the 
matter of sampling errors in a univariate sense. At this stage the 
conclusions would seem to be valid and I believe them to be so, but 
more research on the subject might strengthen the notion that a 
multivariate approach might be more appropriate. Even if this is the 
case, it would be more than difficult to escape the underlying argument. 
CONCLUSION: 
In all cases, the process of sub-sampling the original sample in order to 
develop a MDA model before testing it on a hold-out sample increases 
the size of the sampling errors involved. There can be no justification for 
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this. Obtaining . the best estimates of the population mean ratios for 
companies about which we might wish to say something significant is 
fundamental to the MDA modelling process. It has already been shown 
how sensitive that the MDA technique is to small differences in means. 
The data is frequently scarce enough without wasting it by ensuring that 
our estimates are even less accurate than when we started. The hold-
out sample approach is not only pseudo-scientific at best, it is also less 
efficient than using the total sample to derive the model. 
Chapter Six 
THE PROBLEM OF MISSPECIFICATION. 
INTRODUCTION: 
A major problem with all multivariate modelling, whether it be 
discriminant analysis, multiple regression or another technique is 
that important variables may be left out of the equation. This means 
that the model is incomplete, or in the parlance of the 
econometrician, it is misspecified. Misspecification distorts the 
relative contribution of all the variables involved. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION: 
Although it will not be an easy process, the main thrust in the 
building of multivariate models of corporate distress should be 
towards the correct specification of the particular model. The debate 
in this area of model building has long been either about predictive 
validity or adequate specification of causal relationships. Although 
the former approach seems to have produced some exciting short-
term results over the last two decades, it has failed to achieve 
satisfactory long-term results. After two decades of data dredging, in 
which large quantities of data on small samples of companies has 
almost literally been poured into computerised MDA programmes, 
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little of an enduring quality remains. I suggest that it is time to 
pursue the causal path of enquiry. Before we proceed too far 
however, a cautionary note should be recognised. "Most writers seem to 
agree that an economic theory is useful to provide an initial specification, realising 
that this theory will almost certainly be insufficient for a complete, dynamic 
specification with some missing or poorly measured variables," [Granger, 1990; 
p.18]. · Perfect, or complete specification of economic models is 
probably close to impossible. This, I suspect, is likely to be true in 
the field of corporate distress forecasting, for our integrated 
theoretical base is extremely thin, to say the least. Most of the MDA 
research into classifying and forecasting has been of the data 
dredging type. As a result it would probably be fair to say that all of 
the published models have been misspecified, particularly in relation 
to a macroeconomic context. 
When writing on the subject over two decades ago, Kendall [1967] 
provided a useful cautionary note. '7he systems we have to study are far too 
complicated to permit anything of the kind [i.e., perfect specification] and we shall 
find, I think, that we are continually having to curb an ambition which tempts us to 
build models of too great a generality," [p.2]. He further counsels that "model 
building should start with simple and modest models, and work towards the more 
complicated systems by integration, rather than start with attempts at comprehensive 
models," [p.3]. Kendall's comments are indeed relevant, yet after over 
two decades of almost blind data dredging we need to move 
towards a more satisfactory level of multivariate model specification 
in corporate distress classification and prediction. 
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Mirer [1988] provides a useful discussion on the problems of 
misspecified models. He states that "... it is difficult to decide which 
variables should be included in the model, and it is likely that some models we see or 
create will be misspecified," [p.140i. Although he was talking about 
regression in particular, the same arguments apply to MDA 
modelling for there is a perfect correlation between discriminant z-
scores and binary regression dependent variable estimates when 
both are applied to the same set of data. Mirer continues to point 
out that we are in continual danger of making two types of mistakes 
in specification. "We might exclude a relevant variable from the regression, or we 
might include an irrelevant one," [p.140]. Excluding a relevant variable will 
change the "true" coefficients of every other variable in the model so _ 
that our multivariate relationships are distorted in relation to the way 
that they actually operate. Furthermore the "inclusion of the irrelevant 
variable can lead to the misinterpretation of the true economic process," [p.141 ]. 
This may also produce a confusion between correlation and cause. 
One of the major problems in the MDA modelling of corporate 
distress is that the research community appears to be far from being 
able to produce a concensus about a satisfactorily specified model, 
i.e., there is no commonly accepted theoretical framework. So far 
about 100 ratios have been investigated, cash flow variables have 
been vigorously pursued, non-accounting variables have been put 
forward with varying degrees of enthusiasm, [e.g. Argenti] and 
macroeconomic variables have been suggested, [e.g. Foster]. Each of 
these suggestions will no doubt have a particular validity, yet we still 
have no concensus on specification. Bearing in mind the cautionary 
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note sounded by Kendall, what we need is a correct specification of 
the model of corporate distress. 
As it is not possible to pursue all of the issues involved in this 
process, I will focus on ways in which we might be able to improve 
the specification of our model of distress. These suggestions are not 
put forward as a panacea of all of the problems in this regard, but 
that progress might be made. These issues involve the use of 
macroeconomic variables, the use of lagged variables, and finally the 
potential of a first differences or change approach. Each will be 
examined in turn. Before examining these possibilities, a more 
generalised strategic approach, the top-down approach to 
investment analysis, should provide a more appropriate 
methodology by which we might establish a framework for an 
improved model specification. 
THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH TO FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS: 
For many decades now, practising investment and security analysts 
have recommended that investors should take a systematic 
approach in the search for sound investments. This systematic 
approach involves three stages. Firstly, they have suggested that the 
wider economy should be evaluated to ascertain the extent to which 
the current economic climate and short-term outlook is suitable for 
investing. Secondly, markets and industries should be evaluated in 
the context of a suitable economic outlook. Finally, having satisfied 
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themselves that they have identified a suitable industry or industries, 
investors should carry out the kinds of fundamental analysis of 
financial statements that is commonly recommended in standard 
accounting and finance textbooks. 
Academic investment analysts [e.g. jones,1990; Reilly,1989] have 
subsequently adopted this analytical framework as being rational. In 
chapter nine "The Process and Theory of Valuation", Reilly, [1989], outlines 
his contention that "the discussion should first center on the analysis of 
aggregate economies and over all securities markets. Only after this is done can 
different industries be considered from a global perspective. Finally, following the 
industry analysis, you should consider the securities issued by various firms within 
the better industries," [p:306]. 
The top-down approach requires that an industry context be 
established. Most of the MDA models of corporate distress have 
attempted to reflect this point and have generally not been 
generalised models but industry models. As this is a well recognised 
facet of the modelling process the matter will not be re-examined in 
this thesis. 
In brief, a company does not stand alone as an independent entity. It 
stands within an industry and within an overall economic context. It 
is almost remarkable that this kind of approach has not already been 
applied to the MDA modelling of corporate distress. It is, of course, 
not an easy kind of analysis to carry out as even a cursory reading of 
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writers like Reilly and Jones will reveal. Despite this, it has a simple, 
but not simplistic, logic about it. Rose, Andrews and Giroux 
[discussed fully later in this chapter] clearly demonstrated that the 
quarterly level of corporate collapse in the United States of America 
relates very highly to macroeconomic variables. This combined with 
the simple rationale of the top-down approach to analysis, I believe, 
should lead us towards a more appropriately specified model. This 
model commences with the macroeconomic context. 
1: THE USE OF A MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT: 
All of the multiple discriminant models of corporate failure published 
to date have been microeconomic models. Although two regression 
studies of the relationship between macroeconomic variables and 
the quarterly level of corporate failure have been carried out by 
Altman [1983] and Rose, Andrews and Giroux [1982], there have 
been no such variables incorporated into MDA studies. Although 
Foster [1986] has suggested that there is a need to pursue such 
investigations, it seems strange that while standard accounting 
textbooks [e.g.Gibson, 1989; p.123] frequently recommend that 
company ratios to be interpreted in the light of industry norms or 
averages, researchers have not included any macroeconomic 
variables in order to provide a total environmental context. 
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Altman and Macroeconomic Variables: 
Altman [1983] summarizes his earlier publications in Business Week 
which indicate a relationship between the aggregate level corporate 
failures and five macroeconomic variables which he calls, economic 
growth activity, credit availability or money market activity, capital 
market activity, business population characteristics and price level 
changes. Each of these concepts require some further explanation. 
Economic Growth: ''safes and earnings of individual enterprises are directly 
related to overall business activity .... we should expect a negative correlation between 
series which reflect the nation's economic health and business failures," [p.85]. 
Money Market and Credit Conditions: "One of the more lively current 
economic debates concerns the effect that the nation's monetary stock has on our 
economic conditions ... credit availability and its cost. most certainly does matter .... we 
can expect that the propensity to fail will be increased during periods of relatively 
tight credit conditions vis-a-vis periods of easy credit," [p.86] 
Investor Expectations: ''The relationship between common stock prices and 
business failures is predicated on both empirical and theoretical grounds ...... ln order 
to reflect overall stock market performance, we chose the change in the Standard & 
Poor (S&P) index of stock prices." [p.B7]. 
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Business Population Statistics: " .. when we observe the frequency distribution 
of failures with respect to the age of the firm, aggregate data show quite clearly that 
over one-half of all failures occur within a firm's first five years and almost one-third 
within three years," [p.BB] 
Price Level Changes: " ... increases in prices, especially unanticipated increases, 
tend to be inversely correlated with failure rates," [p.90]. 
The Econometric Model: 
Altman produced a complicated regression model to forecast the 
level of company failures. ''The period 1951 through 1978 was chosen, and a 
set of explanatory variables reflecting various macroecomonic pressures .was 
examined within a first difference, distributed lag regression structure. Findings 
indicate that a firm's propensity to fail is heightened due to the cumulative effects of 
reduced (1) real economic growth, (2) stock market performance, (3) money supply 
growth, and (business formation)," [p.98]. Despite this reassuring statement 
however the adjusted R2 was only an unconvincing 0.26. His 
conclusion however is more important. "Where macroeconomic 
expectations could be extremely important is in the choice of appropriate prior 
probabilities of failure. This level is useful in adjusting the optimum cutoff score for 
micro bankruptcy prediction models," [p.98]. The point has been made 
before but at least Altman attempts to progress down necessary 
channels of research. 
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Despite what might be called a valiant effort to research the 
question, Altman fails to grapple with the problem satisfactorily in 
two ways. Firstly, Altman understates the case for relating company 
failure to macroeconomic variables. Not only does the level of 
company collapse affect the cut-off point by way of the a priori 
probabilities but the macroeconomic context may well radically alter 
our interpretation of a particular set of ratios. A high debt ratio, for 
example, ~ay be viewed favourably in a booming economic 
environment which is likely to remain stable for some time. On the 
other hand the perception would no doubt be markedly different in 
less buoyant times or when the economic outlook is less favourable 
to the fortunes of a particular industry. 
Secondly Altman does not actually prove his case very well at all. 
With an adjusted-R2 of 0.26 he provides little evidence that the level 
of company failure in the United States actually does relate to the 
economy. If corporate collapse actually does relate to economic 
circumstances then Altman has clearly not identified the important 
variables or the appropriate statistical model. Clearly his model is 
misspecified. 
Finally, the level of company collapse, as a percentage of the total 
population of companies over time could actually be held to be so 
small that any variation of the cut-off points that would arise as a 
result of changing a priori probabilities would be so small that it 
could hardly be considered to be material. Altman's United States 
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findings for the period 1950 - 1981 were that the level varied from a 
low of about 25 per 10,000 in 1977 - 78 to a high of nearly 70 
collapsing companies per 10,000 in 1961 - 62. When translated into 
percentage terms these variations in a priori probabilities could 
hardly be held to relate importantly to significant variations in cut-off 
points in discriminant models. If on the other hand the failure rates 
varied more dramatically in particular industries, the issue might be 
of greater importance. 
Rose, Andrews and Giroux and Macroeconomic Variables: 
In a most important piece of research, Rose, Andrews and Giroux 
[1982] have established a much more satisfactory relationship 
between economic indicators and business failure. They employed 
macroeconomic variables and developed a quarterly six variable 
multiple regression model using data from the 1960 to 1980 period. 
The resultant R2 of 0.912 is highly satisfactory and provides adequate 
validity of the model's specification. 
Their basic thesis is found in the statement, ''To the extent that business 
failures are linked to the cycle, the variables suggested by the business cycle theory 
should be correlated with indices of business failure," [p.23]. They argued that 
as "virtually all major theories fall into three groups: 
(1) Supply or cost-push theories; 
(2) Monetary theories; and 
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(3) Savings-investment theories. [p.23], 
then these should be used to identify the relevant macroeconomic 
variables. They also added a list of nine "Leading and Coincident Indicators" 
such as the S&P 500 composite stock price index, the Dow Jones 
industrial average, and the unemployment rate. As a result they 
identified a total of 28 macroeconomic variables for analysis. These 
28 variables were bivariately correlated in order to identify those that 
intercorrelated above the 0.80 level. Those with high 
intercorrelations were discarded, presumably to reduce 
multicollinearity. 
The data was analysed by way of a forward stepwise regression with 
lagged variables. The model finally selected was one containing six 
variables representing each of the three classes of business cycle 
indicators listed above. Four of the indicators had a lagged 
relationship to the level of corporate failure of two to four quarters 
and the other two had no significant lagged relationship in the 
model. 
Rose et.al., have shown quite usefully, that despite doubts about the 
importance of the small numbers involved, certain macroeconomic 
indicators can be used to forecast the level of business failure. 
Although this is both useful in that a priori levels might be used to 
establish cut-off points for discriminant models, the actual variation 
is probably too small to have any significant influence (unless there 
are only quite minor mean differences between the two groups of 
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·course). What is needed is a method by which disc:riminant models 
of corporate failure might incorporate macroeconomic variables. This 
would enable z-score methods to be used by those with an interest 
in evaluating the extent to which an individual company was likely to 
collapse. Rose, Andrews and Giroux have provided convincing 
progress in this respect. They have not solved the problem however, . 
for we still do not appear to be able to build reasonably enduring 
MDA models of corporate distress. 
Market and Industry Effects: 
Another group of studies may provide some of the building materials 
for a much more comprehensive approach to the forecasting of 
corporate distress. These studies were initiated by King [1966] and 
followed up by several other researchers. 
King carried out a factor analytic study of companies on the New 
York Stock Exchange over the period 1927 to 1960. Although he was 
investigating share price movements, rather than company 
collapses, his findings may have some relevance to the future 
direction of the study of forecasting company distress. He !dentified 
what he called a market factor, and industry factor and a unique 
component. His confirmatory cluster analysis indicated that 52% of 
the variation in the share prices could be attributed to a market 
factor and a further 1 Oo/o to a industry factor. Meyers [1973] followed 
this work up and confirmed the importance of both factors, although 
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there was some weakening of the industry factor in a later period. 
Other researchers [e.g. Blume [1971] and Livingston [1977] have 
also confirmed these results in separate studies. 
Although King et.al., have showed that both a market and an 
industry factor seems to exist, and although Rose et.al., have shown 
that there is a strong relationship between macroeconomic variables 
and the incidence of corporate collapse, research in this field has not 
provided a methodology by which we can build macroeconomic 
variables into distress prediction models. The rest of this chapter will 
therefore focus on several possible methods by which this might be 
achieved. 
Identifying Macroeconomic Indicators. 
Identifying the type of macroeconomic indicators that might be 
usefully incorporated into MDA models is a major research problem 
in itself. Here I wish to explore some of the possibilities. 
Forecasting or classifying corporate failure more satisfactorily would 
then require us to include the appropriate macroeconomic variables 
that comprehensively reflect the economic situation. This is a major 
problem in itself for it would appear that we have no single variable 
that can encapsulate the economic conditions of the time. Here we 
need to integrate business cycle theory with corporate distress 
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theory. The proponents of the top-down approach to investment 
analysis no doubt wonder, I suspect, why this has not been 
embraced already. One approach to this problem might be to use a 
array of variables, such as those developed by Rose, et.al. If these 
macroeconomic variables were factor analysed in order to identify 
the underlying factor structures, this would provide a linear 
transformation that might enable us to establish a single composite 
variable that would provide a barometric indication of the state of 
the economy for each year. 
Associated with the problem of identifying a satisfactory measure of 
the state of an economy, before relating this to particular businesses, 
is the question of forecasting the composite variable itself. If 
individual company ratios are to be used to forecast whether 
companies are likely to collapse in a forth-coming period , then we 
will require a model to forecast the likely state of the economy for 
the same period. A z-score would then have to be interpreted 
variously depending upon the forecasted state of the economy itself. 
If it is customary to argue that an industry context should be 
evaluated, then why not a macroeconomic context? The 
microeconomic MDA models published to date are too simplistic if 
they do not include this dimension. Clearly the more traditional 
approach misspecifies the equation. 
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Modelling with Macroeconomic Indicators. 
Having identified a macroeconomic factor it should be possible to 
classify the state of the economy by way of an expansionary 
condition or outlook, a stable or equilibrium condition or outlook, or 
finally a recessionary condition or outlook. In short, it would seem 
that it is necessary to relate financial performance of companies to 
each of the stages in the business cycle. Again, we seem to be 
hampered here by a lack of a suitable theoretical framework for 
evaluating financial ratios. It might be necessary to develop one in 
the process. 
During the first type of economic environment, companies will 
generally be facing expansionary conditions under which all of the 
facets of a growth economy are enjoyed. During this period we 
would expect managements' attitudes and outlooks to be 
reasonably buoyant, their investment and borrowing strategies to be 
expansionary, and even their credit control to be less strictly 
managed. Under these conditions we would expect companies to 
have markedly different ratios than they would during a contracting 
economic period. As already suggested, the mean debt ratio might 
conceivably be higher than in during a recessionary period. This 
hypothesis needs to be evaluated, of course, but the suggestion has 
a plausible, if not logical appeal. Furthermore, as all industries do not 
prosper during the same or similar economic conditions, industry 
factors will need to be taken into account. 
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Similarly, during a period of economic slow-down, business 
confidence would be expected to be reflected in a tailing off of the 
growth rate in sales, at the same time managements' investment 
plans might be expected to be somewhat dampened, and there are 
likely to be signs of tighter managerial control being imposed. 
Management might be expected to pay more attention to the 
collection of receivables, might be expected to take firmer control 
over inventories and might be expected to look towards reducing 
levels of debt. There are many more aspects in which these and 
other factors would be reflected in the financial reports and the 
associated ratios. 
Finally, under conditions of recession, managements might be 
expected to be looking towards radically reducing levels of debt, 
certainly imposing much stricter credit standards and indeed it might 
well reflect the weakness of a company if this has not already been 
carried out by the time a recession arrives. During a recessionary 
period of the business cycle, we would expect different mean ratios 
for a wide range financial measures. 
If this kind of trichotomy of the economy could be established, and 
there do not seem to be any impediments to measuring such a 
phenomenon, then the mean ratios, or other variables, would be 
much more likely to remain stable during similar economic periods. 
The extent to which mean industry ratios for failed and non-failed 
:.. 
companies relates to macroeconomic variables is hypothesized here 
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and would have to be evaluated empirically, but the suggestion 
provides a reasonable starting point. It is difficult to imagine 
alternative relationships. The usage of ratios over many years, during 
which there are several different types economic environments will 
inevitably lead to the collapse of MDA models of corporate distress 
because the respective group mean ratios are extremely unlikely to 
remain stable. There is no theoretical reason for the mean ratios to 
stay the same during such periods of different business conditions. 
This methodology is most unlikely to provide a panacea of all of the 
problems associated with developing stable financial accounting 
measures which will provide the same sort of information signal to 
researchers under all conditions, but the current practice of 
combining all data from diverse economic environments has proven 
itself to be a failure. The multiple linear discriminant method simply 
cannot cope with situations in which a simple debt ratio of 78%, for 
example, means that management has borrowed wisely in order to 
capitalise on expanding opportunities in one economic environment, 
yet in another, reflects over-ambitious, irresponsible or even reckless 
managerial behaviour. By relating the variable to the economic 
conditions in some way, i.e., relating it to the stage in the business 
cycle, we may have a better chance of success. 
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A Three Function Model: 
A three function model then would seem to be warranted. In order 
to test this approach we would probably have to trichotomise the 
economic outlook for each of the forthcoming years according to the 
methods suggested above. We would then need to group the data· 
from each of the preceding years into three sets according to the 
outlook or economic conditions. In this way we would have three 
sets of data which could then be analysed by way of multiple 
discriminant analysis. In short, we would require three models, each 
relating to the three stages of the business cycle because many of 
the mean ratios [or industry norms] could be expected to be 
different under various economic conditions. This approach will 
certainly not solve all of the problems in the modelling of corporate 
collapse, but it has a rationale that relates to a logical framework. It 
relates microeconomic performance of individual companies to 
business cycle theory. 
Such a model might commence with a factor analytic or principal 
component regression based upon the ideas discussed earlier. This 
may enable us to forecast the stage in the business cycle. This, of 
course, will burden us with yet another set of forecasting problems 
but the literature is at least well developed on the subject. 
Subsequent to the development of such a model of the business 
cycle, attention could then be paid to the microeconomic aspects. 
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MDA models might then be developed for each stage in the 
business cycle. Our ability to do this will be a function of our being 
able to specify appropriate models. It will also be a function of the 
extent to which there are significant mean differences between failed 
and non-failed companies, and the extent to which the mean ratios 
might be stable across the years that are characterised by the same 
economic conditions. If we cannot effectively relate particular mean 
ratios to the state of the economy, it is doubtful whether this 
approach will allow us to progress far. It is, I believe, logical and 
provides a reasonable hypothetical framework for further research. 
All of the relationships, however, will not have the same timing 
impact. Some of the relationships are likely to be lagged. 
II: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SET OF lAGGED RElATIONSHIPS: 
Although several studies have evaluated the extent to which various 
models have been able to predict corporate collapse, they have 
simultaneously included all of the ratios and other variables in the 
same time period. This provides a rather flat, uniform and unrealistic 
kind of analysis. Beaver showed that certain ratios tended to indicate 
impending failure several time periods ahead. Macroeconomic 
research has long used leading, lagging and coincident indicators of 
various economic conditions. It is unrealistic for us to expect that all 
of our ratio indicators will have the same time relationship. The 
leading indicators will almost invariably have different, or even 
distributed lagged relationships with the incidence of collapse. Rose, 
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Andrews and Giroux showed this to be the case within their 
forecasting model and it is to be expected that this will also be the 
case with financial indicators. It would be more surprising if this 
were not so. This would require a more realistic specification with 
the inclusion of lagged and possibly distributed lagged relationships 
between the ratios and corporate fortunes. This probably does not . 
make the search for a properly specified MDA model of corporate 
collapse any easier, but the inclusion of such an approach is much 
more likely to allow researchers to reduce the likelihood of 
specification errors. Not only are lagged relationships likely to exist, 
but the dynamics of change in a company's financial condition need 
to be investigated. 
Ill: THE DEVELOPMENT OFA CONTEXT OF CHANGE: 
A major problem with the majority of the corporate distress studies 
carried out to date is that they have tended to be static analyses. 
That is, they tend to reflect the financial conditions of the sampled 
companies at a single point in time, [even those developed from the 
income statement] while the companies themselves are more 
usually in a state of flux or change. The dynamics of company 
performance have not yet been effectively taken into account in the 
modelling process. 
One of the commonly used methods of analysing company financial 
performance is that of standardising the figures in such a way that it 
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produces a "common-sized" balance sheet and income statement. 
Balance sheets can be standardised in a vertical manner by 
expressing all values as a percentage of the company's total assets. 
Similarly, income statements can be standardised in the same 
vertical manner by expressing all values as a percentage of total 
sales. This approach allows us to compare companies and gain 
insights that would otherwise be difficult to make. This approach 
also produces many of the currently and commonly used ratios. 
Although useful, this form of standardising does not add a dimension 
of change however. 
If on the other hand, the financial statements are horizontally 
standardised, the elements of the balance sheets and the income 
statements will be expressed as a percentage of the corresponding 
previous year's figures. Under this method, the total sales revenue, 
for example, would be expressed as a percentage of the previous 
year's sales and thus provide a very succinct expression of the trend 
in the business. Although less commonly used than the vertical 
method of standardising, this approach provides a simple but 
effective way of measuring the extent to which a company's financial 
circumstances are changing. By incorporating this method into the 
MDA modelling of corporate distress we would be doing more than 
merely adding to the potential number of ratios. We would be 
adding a dimension of change into an otherwise static analysis. The 
dynamics of the financial situation that are likely to provide an 
improvement in the specification of corporate distress models. 
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A second method by which the dynamics of company performance 
might be taken into account is in the use of a first differences 
approach. This would involve not just recording the value of a 
particular ratio itself, but also the change in that ratio over the 
previous period. The level of the debt ratio, for example, is one 
single piece of information that might be useful in itself. It may 
partially reflect the vulnerability of the company, yet the direction 
and the magnitude of the change in that ratio, in the context of a 
change in the business cycle might allow us to more fully reflect the 
financial circumstances of the companies involved. In other words, a 
-single ratio such as the debt ratio, provides us with too little 
information. Its information value may be enhanced by measuring 
the change in the ratio. This kind of trend analysis, taken in the light 
of forthcoming economic conditions would provide a more 
comprehensive specification of a model of corporate distress. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
In this chapter I have attempted to grapple with some aspects of the 
need to correctly specify our models of corporate distress. I am 
acutely aware that this is a very difficult task, but the MDA models 
which have been developed have been sadly lacking in this 
dimension. The misspecification of MDA models of corporate 
distress seriously undermine the value of the efforts made to 
develop sound classifying and forecasting methods. The 
development of a macroeconomic context, the inclusion of lagged 
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variables and the inclusion of variables that reflect a more dynamic 
aspect of company performance seem to be important. 
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Chapter Seven 
A RESULTANT MODEL-BUILDING STRATEGY. 
INTRODUCTION: 
It seems that after extensive criticism of the use and misuse of 
Fisher's multiple linear discriminant function over the last two 
decades, both from inside and outside the field of accounting and 
finance, there has been a developing need for a re-examination of 
some of these matters. This need arises because it appears that the 
relative importance of some of the issues now appears to have been 
over stated. This chapter draws together the essential elements of 
the relevant published research, adds the findings of this study and 
attempts to provide a methodological framework in such a way that 
researchers might be able to steer that difficult course between 
dealing with the realities of the kinds of accounting data that we are 
more or less obliged to use and unjustifiably and possibly fatally 
breaching the assumptions. If this can be done, we might have a 
better chance of developing models that will be more universally 
accepted than they have been so far. Before investigating particular 
strategies for handling the rather complex set of issues surrounding 
the use of linear discriminant models in corporate distress research, 
we need to briefly examine the reporting practices of the published 
research, for it would seem to me that in our drive for an economy 
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of words in journal articles, there has been a glossing over of 
important and unresolved aspects of the modelling process, not so 
much in the summary articles [e.g. jones 1986] but in the more 
empirical papers. 
REPORTING STANDARDS: 
Given the complexity of developing valid and durable MDA models, 
the statistical reporting practices of the published body of research 
on the topic has not been such that a rigourous examination of any 
particular researcher's findings is possible. Understandably, the 
editors of academic journals require an economy of words, but I 
suggest that there is a very definite need for more comprehensive 
reporting because multivariate research into classifying and 
forecasting corporate distress is still in its infancy. Given the wealth 
of criticisms in the literature over the last two decades, research 
developments will be more likely to occur if there is a more 
complete reporting of many aspects of particular studies. Financial 
accounting data is not renowned for being ideal for forecasting 
corporate collapses at the best of times, largely because of the 
diversity of accounting policies, and as argued elsewhere in this 
thesis, also because of the lack of stability in mean ratios over time. 
The relationships between the data seem to be varied and complex. 
As a result, a more complete reporting of the statistical analyses 
involved is required. This involves several facets. 
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Despite the fact that the MDA technique assumes the equality of 
the variance-covariance matrices, I can find few instances amongst 
published research where this was actually statistically tested, [e.g. 
Betts & Belhoul,1987; Taffler,1982]. There are conditions under 
which MDA techniques are extremely sensitive to this assumption, 
yet empirical researchers seem to be content with a less than 
satisfactory level of investigation and reporting. I would suggest that 
reported MDA research should include both of the sample variance -
covariance matrices and the tests of the extent of the significance of 
the difference between the two. Despite more than 20 years of 
published research, the state of our knowledge is extremely limited. 
Other researchers are effectively left in the dark about very 
important aspects of the modelling process. 
In fact, even a cursory enquiry into the matter will show that it is 
clear than we understand far too little of the interaction of ratios and 
other accounting variables. Foster [1986, possibly followed by 
Lev,1974] provides perhaps the best collection of reports into 
financial statement analysis, but this question is still in its infancy. 
Developments are much further advanced in the United States, of 
course, but very little is known about New Zealand data, [Firth & 
Mclean,1987]. If MDA research into corporate distress reveals, as I 
suspect, that the variance - covariance matrices of failed and non-
failed companies are significantly different, then we have not failed, 
but have identified a very important area for further research. Why 
then are the covariances between the financial variables of failed and 
non-failed companies significantly different? Although the question is 
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clearly one that we cannot answer yet, a researched answer is very 
definitely required. 
Again, the reporting practices are well below desirable standards 
needed for the further development of our understanding of the 
topic when it comes to evaluating the extent to which the data is 
multivariately normally distributed. Perhaps researchers are too keen 
to report ultimate solutions. Perhaps the issues have not been 
perceived as being important. Perhaps there is another explanation, 
but at best this failure is difficult to justify, particularly in an area of 
research in which we know so few of the answers. If we are in 
breach of the multivariate normality assumption, the extent of this 
should be statistically evaluated and reported in the published 
account. It would seem that researchers in the field of corporate 
distress too readily overlook the findings of researchers in the 
associated disciplines of multivariate statistics and econometrics. The 
evidence is that such matters are frequently important. In a way this 
tendency is understandable for many researchers using the MDA 
technique in accounting and finance do not appear to be well 
educated in the field of multivariate statistics, and indeed, to be fair, 
it is difficult to be well educated in both fields, but I believe that the 
quality of our research in this field depends upon it. 
The kinds of reporting needed for the development of the field of 
multivariate modelling of corporate distress requires us to return to 
some elementary issues. Because of the difficulties of obtaining 
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·"good data", I would prefer to see the original data reported so that it 
can be available for scientific scrutiny. This might be asking too 
much of academic journals however. Because multivariate normality 
is almost always an issue, then the tests of significance of the extent 
to which the groups of failed and non-failed companies depart from 
this criterion should be reported. Because the question of the 
equality of the variance - covariance matrices is almost always an 
issue, then the actual sample matrices and the tests of the extent of 
the difference between the two groups should be published. Finally, 
because the significance of the difference between the mean vectors 
of ratios, [and indeed other variables if they are used], is perhaps the 
most critical issue, then the mean vectors and probably the 
univariate, if not the multivariate tests of the significance of the 
difference between the two should be reported. 
·The flow of research articles in the field of forecasting corporate 
distress has dried up somewhat in more recent years, possibly 
reflecting not so much that fact that the subject has been fathomed, 
but more the frustration of not being able to satisfactorily achieve 
the objective of classifying and predicting. Finally, perhaps it is time 
for a comprehensive collection of articles and source data to be 
made available to ·the international research community so that 
further progress might be made in the field. It is clear that we know 
so little about forecasting corporate distress from financial 
accounting data, if indeed, it is ultimately possible. Further progress 
will no doubt depend on research into other variables such as cash 
flows, macroeconomic indicators, strategic management decisions, 
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as well as financial accounting reports, but the full reporting of the 
research findings, strengths and weaknesses, should be encouraged 
as part of the empirical process. 
THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUES: 
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Combined research into the distress modelling process has resulted 
in many aspects being discussed widely in the literature. Non-
statisticians wishing to use the MDA technique on their data could 
easily be forgiven for being confused. Not only is there a need for 
more complete reporting of research in this field, but there is also a 
need for a clear statement of the most critical methodological steps 
required. I suggest that there are six issues of vital importance. 
Although widely discussed in the literature as being of critical 
importance, I have tried to draw from the literature, and from the 
results of the experimentation carried out in this particular research, 
the notion that the those issues widely held to be critical may not be 
as important as suggested in earlier publications. While they are 
indeed important, they are of lesser importance. In order of 
significance these are; the selection of the variables involved i.e, a 
correctly specified model, the need for random sampling from well-
defined populations, the efficient use of the sample data, the need 
for mean variables that are stable over time, significance of the 
difference between the respective group means on each of the 
variables used in the modelling process, and finally, intertemporal 
validation. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
1: Selection of the Variables. 
The most important issue would seem to be that of the selection of 
the variables. Misspecification of models is a subject 
comprehensively addressed in the econometrics literature. Within 
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the corporate distress prediction and classification literature the 
question of choosing appropriate ratios and other variables seems to 
be treated with less concern than it should be. If the wrong variables 
are chosen then the model will be misspecified. As yet there is little 
concensus about a corporate distress theory and as a result perhaps 
all models are in danger of being misspecified. Research into this 
aspect will no doubt involve a long arduous process before we are 
able to specify multivariate models satisfactorily. 
II: Random Sampling. 
Of all the violations of the assumptions in MDA research into 
corporate distress, I think that the failure to use proper random 
sampling methods is one of the least forgivable. The failure to use 
random samples, or at least stratified random sampling methods 
where this might be appropriate, means that after all of the work 
that might have gone into the development of a particular model of 
corporate distress, the best that we can say is that the results are 
sample specific. Researchers seeking to develop MDA models must 
pay more than cursory homage to this issue for it is vital to our 
ability to speak meaningfully about the parent population. 
Jones [1987] points out that there still exists a bias in our sampling 
procedure when we attempt to collect samples of failed and non-
failed companies because failed companies are most often found in 
the smaller unlisted companies. Size appears to be a significant 
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variable and thus our sampling of listed companies tends to make 
the samples unrepresentative. This is a difficult problem to 
overcome. Most of the smaller companies that collapse are privately 
owned and the data is not generally publicly available. 
Probably as an integral part of correct specification clear definition of 
the population about which we will eventually wish to speak. Unless 
we are extremely fortunate, without random sampling from an 
appropriate sampling frame, MDA models will at best be sample 
specific. Where the population data cannot be used, the first step in 
the MDA modelling process is therefore to define the respective 
populations precisely and to select at random from the group of 
failed and non-failed companies. This is a demanding process, and 
one that enthusiastic researchers might be inclined to pay scant 
attention, or be seduced away to somehow hand pick the 
companies (frequently called matching or matched pairs), but it 
must be done scientifically. No lesser standard can be accepted or 
the results will be biased and sample specific. 
Ill: Using the Sample Data Efficiently and Effectively. 
The third most critical issue in MDA model development is that of 
effectively and efficiently using the data that we have gathered. As 
already indicated in chapter five of this thesis, the findings of this 
research are completely dismissive of the use of hold-out sample 
methods. The main argument is that using such methods only adds 
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confusion to an already difficult process. Data on failed companies is 
frequently so scarce and the sample sizes are often so small that the 
further sub-division of the sample into one from which the MDA 
model is derived and a hold-out sample only serves to increase the 
errors involved. I find it difficult, if not impossible, to find any virtues 
in the hold-out sample method. Of course, the abandoning of hold-
out sample methods alone will not guarantee that models will 
proceed beyond sample specificity but model builders are more 
likely to be able to develop models that will endure the inevitable 
rigours of cross examination if they employ the best available sample 
company data in the model-building process. This will reduce the 
magnitude of the sampling errors involved. 
IV: The Need for Stable Mean Vectors. 
The fourth critical issue in the development of corporate distress 
models is that of obtaining mean ratios for different time periods for 
each of the failed and the non-failed groups of companies that are 
stable over time. This is probably by far the greatest stumbling-block 
to the eventual development of models that will validate both in an 
ex poste and ex ante manner. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
research to identify ratio data which might provide means that are 
stable over time, it is important to recognise that multiple 
discriminant analysis primarily works off means and mean 
differences. An early step in the MDA model-building process must 
be the search for such ratios that provide a consistent signal. The 
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problem has always been that some mean ratios vary quite 
significantly [e.g: Lev 1974; Foster 1986] from year to year as 
economic factors, the mix of business decisions, financing decisions, 
operating decisions, financial reporting policies and the 
macroeconomic environment each vary over time. During some 
economic time periods particular industries experience varying 
fortunes which are reflected in the financial statistics. Unless the 
mean ratios remain stable over time, then it is very difficult to 
foresee a situation in which MDA models could ever validate 
intertemporarily. If there is a single obstacle to the successful use of 
MDA techniques in forecasting and classifying corporate distress, it is 
likely to be the aspect that stable group means for each of the 
variable involved are an absolute necessity. 
The problem is that even when historical data seems to point in the 
direction of the stability of mean ratios for failed and non-failed 
companies, in projecting into the future it is not possible to know 
whether or not this phenomenon will continue to hold. Without this, 
the use of multivariate techniques, and possibly the use of 
accounting ratios, for prediction purposes appears to be doomed to 
failure. 
Dambolena and Khoury [1980] used the standard deviation of the 
ratios as a measure of variability in their study and developed two 
discriminant models; one using these measures and the other 
without. They found that the model using the standard deviation 
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classified significantly better. This may a step in the right direction, 
but it does not satisfy the need for stable mean ratios over time. 
Fisher's model was developed originally for scientific data whose 
measurements were unlikely to change. Any departure from this is 
likely to present what appear to be insurmountable problems for 
those of us using less stable measurements. 
V: The Need for Significant Differences in Groups Means of the 
Variables Involved. 
It would seem that in our somewhat blind search for ratios or data 
we may not have been clear about the kind of ratios or variables that 
will enable us to discriminate well. The fifth critical issue in the MDA 
modelling of corporate distress is that of the significance of the 
difference between the means of the variables between the failed 
and the non-failed companies. 
Firstly, chapter two illustrated the fact that while it was accepted 
that a priori probabilities are important in the modelling process, the 
issue pales into insignificance compared with the need to have a 
significant difference between the means on the original variables. 
Secondly, the question of the multivariate normality of the data, and 
the equality of the variance-covariance matrices may be of 
importance, yet the arguments put forward in chapter four together 
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with earlier studies by researchers like Lachenbruch, and Gilbert, for 
example, support the notion that these issues may be less critical 
than the significance of the difference between the mean of the 
variables involved. 
The concept of mean variables or ratios being significantly different 
embodies two interdependent ideas. The first is obviously that the 
means of the respective groups must be sufficiently separated. If the 
means are not sufficiently separated then we are effectively 
searching amongst fine differences and multivariate normality, the 
equality of the variance - covariance matrices and a priori 
probabilities then become more important. If this is the case then 
we might have to conclude that the basis of our discrimination is 
poor however. The second important underlying notion that is 
important to the search for a significant difference in the means is 
the dispersion of the variables. If the means are well separated and 
the respective standard deviations are relatively small then the 
variables will provide significant discrimination. 
The MDA modelling of corporate distress will only be successful to 
the extent that there is a significant difference between the 
individual group means of the original data in the model. Without 
this phenomenon, all else is a complete waste of time. Multivariate 
normality, nor the equality of the variance-covariance matrices, nor 
the correct usage of a priori adjusted cut-off points will save the 
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particular research from being a futile pursuit of insignificance. All 
else pales. 
VI: lntertemporal Validation: 
It is with a good measure of uncertainty that I suggest that 
intertemporal validation is possibly the sixth critical issue. This is 
because there is a sense in which any data held back from the 
sample is a hold-out sample, and, I have already dismissed the hold-
out method as being both pseudo-scientific and an inefficient use of 
data. I think that I would resolve my dilemma by arguing that in any 
model building exercise we should use all of the available data for 
the reasons outlined earlier. It is probable that the process of model 
construction will take some time. This elapsed time period will 
probably provide more data for ex ante validation. If carefully 
specified models do not validate intertemporarily then I suggest that 
it is more appropriate to search for reason why this might be so 
rather than merely data dredge for another variable. 
ISSUES OF A LESSER KIND: 
Perhaps not so much "much ado about nothing" as a question of the 
relative importance of a few issues is at stake here. Having analysed 
the first sixth critical issues suggested in this chapter, the question of 
--------------- -~ 
the multivariate normality of the distribution of the data, the equality 
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of the variance-covariance matrices and a priori probabilities needs 
to be examined for their relative importance in the modelling 
process. I suggest that not only are these issues are seventh, eighth 
and ninth in ranking, but that the measurement scale is ordinal, not 
interval, for they are of much lesser importance. Much research has 
been carried out to show that many models appear to classify 
satisfactorily, despite the breach of the assumptions, yet they have 
little time-robustness. This failure to stand the test of time derives 
from the first six critical issues rather than the remaining three issues 
whose importance this research suggests has been over-
emphasized in the literature. 
VII: Multivariate Normality. 
The seventh critical issue is the question of multivariate normality. 
As is well known multivariate normality is one of the major pillars 
upon which Fisher developed his multiple linear discriminant 
function. The conventional wisdom in the literature can be classified 
in either of two ways. There are those who argue that unless ratio 
data for failed and non-failed companies is multivariately normally 
distributed the resultant MDA models are highly likely to be 
'unsatisfactory because probabilities of group membership are 
difficult, if not impossible to estimate with any degree of confidence. 
On the other hand, numerous applied or empirical researchers have 
ignored the this requirement and found that their models seem to 
~-~-
classify their particular data quite adequately. The most common 
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empirical research practice has been to ignore the question of 
testing for multivariate normality and simply run the ratio data for 
failed and non-failed companies through a particular MDA computer 
programme and observe the extent to which the model correctly 
classifies the companies. The extent to which the multivariate 
normality assumption is critical, is not so much in the determination 
of the discriminant coefficients, but in the probabilities of 
classification and the extent to which we are able to make 
statements about the significance of the difference between the 
centroids of the z-scores of the failed and non-failed companies. 
Obviously, without any knowledge of the distributional properties, 
we are unable to make satisfactory statements about the probability 
of a particular company belonging to the failed and non-failed 
groups. 
However desirable it would seem to be to have all ratio data 
multivariately normally distributed, it appears that such a quality is 
almost always elusive. We are highly unlikely to find convenient ratio 
or other financial accounting data with such properties. Watson 
[1990] does provide some hope in this regard by using 
transformations but we might have cause to reflect upon the extent 
to which highly transformed data can be said to reflect observable 
phenomena. Some researchers might well find grounds for resisting 
complex transformations of easily measurable phenomena merely to 
conform to some vague notion of multivariate normality. 
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If researchers find that their data is not multivariately normally 
distributed, or that it is undesirable or impossible to transform into 
new variables with such properties, then all is not necessarily lost. 
The findings of chapter two, and particularly chapter four, show that 
even if data is not appropriately distributed it might be quite 
satisfactorily used to develop MDA models of corporate distress 
classification. The graph sequences in chapter two show that 
provided mean differences are sufficiently large, then the question of 
the distribution of the original data becomes of lesser importance. 
There is a trade-off between desirable distributional properties and 
the magnitude of mean differences. It is only where distributions 
overlap that the relative probabilities are of critical importance. For 
example, if the mean current ratios for failed and non-failed 
companies are not markedly different then such a ratio will only add 
marginal significance to distinguishing between the two groups. On 
the other hand, if the mean debt ratio for failed companies is 90o/o 
and the mean debt ratio for non-failed companies is 1 Oo/o and there 
is no group overlap on this particular ratio, then I would argue that 
the question of multivariate normality is almost, if not, irrelevant. The 
greater the significance of the distanc;e between the respective mean 
ratios the more satisfactory our MDA models will be irrespective of 
the distributional properties of the raw ratio data. 
It seems that it is highly unlikely that we will find ratio data that is 
multivariately normally distributed. This does not necessarily limit 
our ability to develop a linear discriminant model. This reduces our 
ability to classify by way of relative probabilities, for without any 
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knowledge of the respective distributions we are unable to compare 
the respective ordinates by which the probabilities of group 
membership are established. Compensating for a lack of perfection 
in the distributional properties of the data is the significance of the 
difference between the mean ratios. The more marked are the 
differences between the me(ln ratios of failed and non-failed 
companies the less critical this issue becomes. 
What can we say to empirical researchers who wish to develop 
MDA models of corporate distress? Firstly, test for multivariate 
normality with the appropriate statistical tests. Secondly, report the 
findings of such tests in any subsequent publication so that 
interested readers can make appropriate judgements. Thirdly, focus 
attention upon identifying ratios and other information whose means 
for failed and non-failed companies are significantly different. The 
greater the significance of the difference between the means the 
greater will be the compensation for any breach of the statistical 
assumptions. 
VIII: Equality of the Variance- Covariance Matrices. 
The equality of the variance - covariance matrices was another of the 
pillars upon which Fisher founded his multiple linear discriminant 
model for distinguishing between two or more groups. As well as 
investigating the extent to which it is possible to discriminate 
between failed and non-failed companies when the data is not 
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multivariately normally distributed, the question of the extent to 
which it was possible to classify correctly when the respective 
variance- covariance matrices were unequal was also investigated in 
chapter four. This equality assumption is important for MDA 
classification procedures for if this condition is not satisfied then the 
standard deviations of the z-scores of the two groups will not be 
equal. Again, however, there is a trade-off equality and the 
significance of the difference between the respective group mean 
ratios. As the group mean ratios are separated MDA models classify 
successively better. This is the key to improved classification. 
IX: A Priori Probabilities. 
Finally, the relative importance of the use of a priori probabilities 
needs to placed in an appropriate context. Chapter two attempted to 
show the extent of the importance of the use of a priori probabilities. 
Clearly such . probabilities are of importance to the scientific 
establishment of cut-off points, and to the estimation of the 
population distributions of the z-scores when the variance -
covariance matrices are unequal. As the significance of the difference 
between respective group m'eans on the original data become 
greater the lesser of an issue a priori probabilities becomes. It is 
really only where the differences are insignificant that fine 
distinctions become critical. If this is the case then we might well be 
advised to reassess the extent to which we have an adequate theory 
of corporate failure. It would seem that it is likely to be more 
'!·I': l!BRA!'tY 
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profitable to spend additional research energy pursuing the matter of 
the significance of the difference between the means than to refine 
the measurement of a priori probabilities. 
CONCLUSION: 
The results of this investigation into why multiple linear discriminant 
models of corporate distress themselves rapidly find themselves to 
be in a distressed condition are surprisingly straight forward. The 
study began as an investigation into some of the more complex 
statistical issues yet understanding the conclusions reached does 
not require a sophisticated multivariate statistical background. The 
most important issues in the MDA modelling process are those 
relating to model specification, sample selection, the efficient use of 
data, the ultimate drive for both real and stable differences between 
the variables selected, and intertemporal validation. The more 
complex issues of multivariate normality, the equality of the 
variance-covariance matrices, and a priori probabilities should not be 
allowed to override the importance of the basic scientific processes 
that should be involved. 
A: 1 
Appendix 4:1 
Four Ratio Case 
Percentage Correct Classifications by Mean and Variance - Covariance 
Matrix Differences. · 
Run No.1. 
M.D. 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.0 
1:1 50 53 64 74 81 87 92 95 97 99 99 100 100 
2:1 50 49 56 68 76 83 88 91 94 96 98 99 99 
3:1 50 49 51 62 71 79 85 90 92 94 96 97 98 
4:1 50 49 49 57 67 75 83 87 91 93 95 97 98 
Run No.2. 
1:1 50 53 65 75 82 88 92 95 97 99 99 100 100 
2:1 50 49 58 68 76 84 89 93 95 97 98 98 99 
3:1 50 48 53 62 72 80 86 89 93 95 96 97 98 
4:1 50 49 49 58 67 76 84 88 91 93 95 96 97 
A: 2 
Run No.3. I 
1:1 50 55 67 76 84 90 93 96 98 99 100 100 100 I 
2:1 50 50 59 68 78 85 90 93 95 98 99 99 100 I 
3:1 50 48 53 63 73 81 87 91 93 96 97 98 99 I 
4:1 50 49 49 59 68 78 84 89 92 94 96 97 98 I 
Run No.4. 
1:1 50 54 68 78 85 90 94 97 98 99 100 100 100 
2:1 50 49 60 71 79 87 91 94 96 97 98 99 99 
3:1 50 48 54 66 76 83 89 92 95 96 97 98 98 
4:1 50 48 50 61 72 81 87 91 94 95 96 97 98 
Run No.5. I 
1:1 50 55 65 74 83 .go 94 97 98 99 99 100 100 I 
2:1 50 50 57 67 76 83 90 94 96 97 98 99 100 I 
3:1 50 48 53 64 72 80 87 91 94 96 97 97 99 I 
4:1 50 48 49 59 68 77 83 89 92 94 96 97 97 l 
A: 3 
Run No.6. 
1:1 50 55 65 75 83 89 93 96 98 99 99 100 100 
2:1 50 49 57 68 77 84 89 93 96 98 98 99 100 
3:1 50 48 52 63 73 81 86 91 94 96 97 98 99 
4:1 50 49 49 59 69 77 83 88 92 94 95 96 98 
Run No.7. 
1:1 50 54 67 77 83 90 95 97 98 99 100 100 100 
2:1 50 49 60 71 79 85 90 94 96 98 99 99 100 
3:1 50 48 54 65 76 82 88 92 94 96 97 98 99 
4:1 50 48 50 61 72 79 86 90 93 94 96 97 98 
Run No.8. 
1:1 50 53 66 74 82 88 92 96 97 99 99 100 100 
2:1 50 49 57 67 76 83 89 92 95 97 98 99 99 
3:1 50 49 52 . 63 70 79 85 90 93 95 96 97 98 
4:1 50 49 48 57 67 76 82 87 91 94 96 96 97 
A: 4 
Run No.9. 
1:1 50 54 66 75 82 88 93 95 97 98 99 99 100 
2:1 50 49 60 69 77 84 90 92 95 97 98 99 99 
3:1 50 49 52 64 73 80 87 90 94 95 97 98 98 
4:1 50 49 48 60 69 77 83 89 91 94 95 96 98 
Run No.10. 
1 :1 50 54 65 75 82 89 93 96 98 99 99 100 100 
2:1 50 49 58 69 77 85 88 93 95 97 98 99 99 
3:1 50 48 52 63 73 81 86 90 93 95 97 97 98 
4:1 50 48. 49 59 70 77 84 88 92 94 95 96 97 
M.D. = The standardised mean differences between the ratios of failed 
and non failed companies. 
1 :1 = The variance- covariance matrices of failed and non-failed 
companies are equal. 
3:1 . = The variance- covariance matrix of the failed companies is three 
times as large as that of non-failed companies. 
A: 5 
I Appendix 4:2 
Mean Percentages of Correct Classifications 
Mean Results 
M.D. 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.0 
The Two Ratio Case 
1:1 50 51 59 67 74 80 84 88 91 94 96 97 98 
2:1 50 49 52 60 67 74 79 84 88 91 93 95 96 
3:1 50. 50 48 54 62 69 75 80 85 88 91 93 95 
4:1 so 50 47 50 58 65 71 77 82 86 89 91 93 
- The Three Ratio Case 
1:1 50 53 63 72 79 85 89 93 96 98 99 99 100 
2:1 50 49 55 65 73 80 85 90 93 95 97 98 99 
3:1 50 49 50 ·60 68 76 82 87 90 93 95 96 97 
4:1 50 49 48 55 . 64 72 79 84 88 91 93 95 96 
A: 6 
Appendix 4:3 
Standard Deviations of the Simulated Mean Ratios. 
M.D. 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.0 
The Two Ratio Case. 
1:1 0.00 0.40 0.94 1.17 1.37 1.10 0.98 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.54 0.49 0.46 
2:1 0.00 0.46 0.49 1.36 1.45 1.50 1.35 1.12 0.92 0.92 0.75 0.54 0.45 
3:1 0.00 0.50 0.45 0.70 1.36 1.72 1.47 1.49 1.11 1.18 0.98 0.89 0.50 
4:1 0.00 0.30 0.54 0.301.43 1.741.85 1.741.25 1.421.401.00 0.70 
The Three Ratio Case 
1:1 0.00 0.78 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.78 0.66 0.75 0.60 0.78 0.60 0.40 0.40 
2:1 0.00 0.63 0.92" 1.40 1.33 1.10 1.04 0.81 0.80 0.75 0.64 0.70 0.75 
3:1 0.00 0.30 0.70 1.11 1.00 1.04 1.11 0.92 0.70 0.49 0.75 0.45 0.64 
4:1 0.00 0.30 0.60 0.98 1.40 1.27 1.11 1.17 1.00 0.64 0.75 0.60 0.45 
A:7 
The Four Ratio Case 
I 0.00 0.42 1.47 1.42 1.20 1.23 0.83 0.99 0.67 0.63 0.42 0.47 0.50 
I 0.00 0.40 1.40 1.36 1.14 1.19 0.92 0.94 0.64 0.60 0.40 0.45 0.49 
I 0.00 0.46 0.92 1.20 1.81 1.20 1.20 0.92 0.81 0.66 0.46 0.50 0.49 
I 0.00 0.49 0.63 1.34 1.81 1.62 1.45 1.20 0.94 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.49 
The Ten Ratio Case 
0.00 1.00 0.98 0.87 0.90 0.64 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.98 1.10 1.20 1.30 0.80 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.49 1.37 1.36 1.20 0.98 0.40 0.54 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.45 1.27 1.36 1.20 1.20 0.70 0.60 0.30 0.40 0.46 0.40 0.00 
= The standardised mean differences between the ratios of failed 
on-failed companies. 
The variance - coviariance matrices of failed and non-failed 
anies are equal. 
The variance - covariance matrix of the failed companies is three 
as large as that of non-failed companies. 
Appendix 4:4 
Basic Language Simulation Programme 
10 PRINT "Linear Discriminant Analysis Simulation" 
20 G =2 
30 PRINT 
40 DIM M(G) 
50 PRINT 11 Number of Failed Companies 11 
60 INPUT M(1) 
70 K(2) = M(1) 
80 M = M(1) + M(2) 
85 PRINT "Number of 25\ Mean differences" 
90 INPUT NMS 
100 PRINT "Number of Variables" 
110 INPUT N 
120 DIM P(G), D(N,M), S(N,N), X(N), T(N), C(N+1,G), A(N,G), F(G) 
130 P(1) = .5 
140 P(2) = 1 - P(2) 
150 PRINT "Minimum Variance-Covariance Difference Required" 
160 INPUT NC 
170 PRINT "Maximin Variance-Covariance Difference Required" 
180 INPUT NCOV 
185 DIM CHAT(NCOV,NHS) 
190 REM 
200 PRINT 
210 PRINT "System Generating Random Ratios for Non-Failed Co 
220 REM 
230 PRINT 
240 RANDOMIZE 
250 K1 = 12 
260 FOR J • 1 TO M/2 
270 FOR I • 1 TO N 
280 A .. 0 
290 FOR J< m 1 TO J<1 
300 A • A + RND(1) 
310 NEXT K 
320 D(I,J) = A 
330 NEXT I 
340 NEXT J 
350 PRINT 
360 PRINT "System Standardizing Non~Failed Company Ratios" 
370 DIM XBAR(N), SD(N) 
380 FOR J • 1 TO M/2 
390 FOR I c 1 TO N 
400 XBAR(I) • XBAR(I) + D(I,J) 
410 NEXT I 
420 NEXT J 
430 FOR I a 1 TO N 
440 XBAR(I) = XBAR(I)/(M/2) 
450 NEXT I 
460 FOR J = 1 TO M/2 
A: 9 
470 FOR I = 1 TO N 
480 SD(I) = SD(I) + (D(I,J) - XBAR(I)) A2 
490 NEXT I 
500 NEXT J 
510 FOR I = 1 TO N 
520 SD(I) = (SD(I)/ (M/2 -1i). · 5 
530 NEXT I 
540 FOR J = 1 TO M/2 
550 FOR I = 1 TO N 
560 D(I,J) = (D(I,J)-XBAR(I))/SD(I) 
570 NEXT I 
580 NEXT J 
590 REM 600 REM Loop through to Increase Variance - covariance Diff 
610 REM 620 PRINT "System Generating FAILED Company Ratios" 
630 FOR NRR = NC TO NCOV 
640 REM 
650 REM Loop through to Increase Mean Ratio Differences 
660 SM = -.25 
670 FOR NM = 1 TO NMS 
680 E = 0 
690 SM = SM + .25 
700 FOR J • (M/2+1) TO M 
710 FOR I = 1 TO N 
720 D(I,J) = D(I,J-M/2)*(NRR+1) •• 5+SM 
730 NEXT I 
740 NEXT J 
750 PRINT 
760 PRINT "NOW computing the Discriminant Model for" 
770 PRINT "Variance-Covariance Difference = ";NRR 
780 PRINT "Mean Vector Difference = ";SM 
790 REM 
800 REM Initialise Vectors and Matrices. 
810 T • 0 
820 FOR I • 0 TO N 
830 X(I) "" 0 
840 T(I) = 0 
850 FOR K = 0 TO N 
860 S(I,K) = 0 
870 NEXT K 
880 NEXT I 
890 FOR I "" 0 TO G 
900 F(G) ., 0 
910 FOR K • 0 TO N 
920 C(K,I) •0 
930 A(K,I) • 0 
940 NEXT K 
950 C(N+1,I)=O 
. 960 NEXT I 
A: 10 
: 970 REM 
· 980 REM Compute mean vectors and Covariance Matrices. 
990 REM 
1000 FOR K = 1 TO G 
1010 FOR J = 1 TO M(K) 
1020 FOR I = 1 TO N 
1030 X(I)= D(I,J+M(1)*(K-1)) 
1040 A(I,K) = A(I,K) + X(I) 
1050 IF K=1 AND J=1 THEN T(I)=X(I) 
. 1060 NEXT I 
! 1070 FOR I = 1 TO N 
1080 FOR L = 1 TO I 
1090 S(L,I)= S(L,I) + (X(L) - T(L))*(X(I)-T(I)) 
1100 NEXT L 
1110 NEXT I 
1120 NEXT J 
1130 NEXT K 
1140 FOR K = 1 TO G 
1150 FOR J = 1 TO N 
1160 FOR I = 1 TO J 
1170 S(I,J) = S(I,J)-(A(I,K)-M(K)*T(I))*(A(J,K)-M(K)*T(J))/M(K) 
1180 NEXT I 
1190 NEXT J 
1200 T = T+M(K) 
1210 NEXT K 
1220 FOR J s 1 TO N 
1230 FOR I • 1 TO J 
1240 S(I,J) = S(I,J)/(T-G) 
1250 S(J,I)= S(I,J) 
1260 NEXT I 
1270 NEXT J 
1280 FOR K .. 1 TO G 
1290 FOR I s 1 TO N 
1300 A(I,K) = A(I,K)/M(K) 
1310 NEXT I 
1320 NEXT K 
1330 REM 
1340 REM PRINT OUT THE MEAN VECTORS and COVARIANCE MATRICES. 
1350 REM 
1360 FOR K = 1 TO G 
1370 PRINT 
1380 IF K>l THEN GOTO 1410 
1390 PRINT • FAILED COMPANIES' MEANS" 
1400 GOTO 1420 
1410 PRINT • NON-FAILED COMPANIES' MEANS" 
1420 FOR I • 1 TO N 
1430 IF ABS(A(I,K))<.005 THEN A(I,K) = 0 
A:ll 
1440 PRINT USING "variable ff flff,ff";I;A(I,K) 
1450 NEXT I 
1460 NEXT K 
1470 PRINT 
1480 PRINT "Pooled VARIANCE - COVARIANCE MATRIX" 
1490 FOR I = 1 TO N 
1500 PRINT 
1510 FOR J = 1 TO I 
1520 PRINT TAB((J-1)*10);INT(S(I,J)*100)/100; 
1530 NEXT J 
1540 PRINT 
1550 NEXT I 
1560 PRINT 
1570 REM 
1580 REM CALCULATE THE DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION. 
1590 REM 
1600 FOR K = 1 TO N 
1610 P .. S(K,K) 
1620 FOR J = K TO N 
1630 IF ABS(P)>ABS(S(J,K)) THEN GOTO 1660 
1640 I z::.J 
1650 P.,. S(J,K) 
1660 NEXT J 
1670 IF K=I THEN GOTO 1730 
1680 FOR J= 1 TO N 
1690 P .. S(K,J) 
1700 S(K,J)=S(I,J) 
1710 S(I,J) = P 
1720 NEXT J 
1730 FOR I = 1 TO N 
1740 IF I. a K THEN GOTO 1790 
1750 FOR J • 1 TO N 
1760 IF J = K THEN GOTO 1780 
1770 S(I,J) = S(I,J)-S(I,K)*S(K,J)/S(K,K) 
1780 NEXT J 
1790 NEXT I 
1800 FOR·I = 1 TON 
1810 IF I • K THEN GOTO 1840 
1820 S(K,I)"" S(K,I)/~(K,K) 
1830 S(I,K) = S(I,K)/S(K,K) 
1840 NEXT I 
1850 S(K,K)~ -1/S(K,K) 
1860 NEXT K _ 
1870. FOR K • 1 TO G 
1880 FOR I .. 1 TO N 
1890 C(I,K) = 0 
1900 FOR J • 1 TO N 
1910 C(I,K) = C(I,K)- A(J,K)*S(I,J) 
1920 NEXT J 
A: 12 
1930 NEXT I 
_ 1940 FOR I = 1 TO N 
1950 C(N+1,K) C(N+1,K) + C(I,K)*A(I,K) 
1960 NEXT I 
i 1970 C(N+1,K) = -C(N+1,K)/2 
1980 NEXT K 
1990 REM 
2000 REM Classify Results 
2010 REM 
2020 FOR K = 1 TO G 
2030 FOR J = 1 TO M(K) 
2040 FOR I = 1 TO N 
2050 X(I) = D(I,J+M(1)*(K-1)) 
2060 NEXT I. 
2070 FOR H • 1 TO G 
2080 F(H) =0 
2090 FOR I = 1 TO N 
2100 F(H) • F(H) +X(I)*C(I,H) 
2110 NEXT I 
2120 F(H) = F(H) + C(N+1,H)+LOG(P(H)) 
2130 NEXT H 
2140 L .,. 1 
2150 P .,. F(1) 
2160 FOR H .,. 2 TO G 
2170 IF F(H) > P THEN P=F(H):L = H 
2180 NEXT H 
2190 IF L<>K THEN E=E+1 
2200 NEXT J 
2210 NEXT It 
2220 PRINT 
2230 PRINT USING "flff,ft t Misclassified"; E*100/M 
2240 PRINT "**************************************************' 
2245 CMAT(NRR,NM)= 100-(E*100/M) 
2250 NEXT HM 
2260 NEXT NRR 
2280 FOR J • 0 TO NMS 
2285 INPUT Y 
2290 PRINT J,CMAT(O,J),CMAT(1,J),CMAT(2,J),CMAT(J,J) 
2300 NEXT J 
3000 STOP 
A: 13 
Appendix 5:1 
Increased Errors from Hold-Out Samples from Finite Populations 
[[Standard error of sub-sample - standard error of sample]/[Standard 
error of the sample] - 1.] *1 00 
Simplifies to: 
{ {[{[N-n/aJ/[N-1]} /(n/a)rh/[{[N-n]/[N-1 ]}/(n)rh}-1} * 1 oo 
which simplifies to: 
{[[a(N-n/a)]/(N-n))lh -1} * 100 
which simplifies to: 
{[a(N-n/a)/(N-n)Th -1}* 100 
B: 1 
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